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ABSTRACT 
This research explores the effects of current and proposed 
changes to equipment, doctrine, and training on the 
effectiveness of the fire-support process in Enhanced 
Company Operations (ECO).  ECO envisions restructuring the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force around companies rather than 
battalions.  The fire support element of rifle companies is 
the Fire Support Team (FiST). 
 The researcher uses an agent-based model to develop 
data on the frequency and duration of contacts with enemy 
forces.  Subsequently, he uses a deterministic fatigue 
model to gain insight into the effects of various rest 
policies over a set of noise factors.  Finally, the 
research uses the data gathered from the agent-based and 
fatigue models to populate a discrete-event model.  This 
model represents the fire-support process.  State-of-the-
art design of experiments is used to explore the  
discrete-event model. 
Analysis of the results of the discrete-event model 
suggests that authority to clear fires needs to be pushed 
down to the FiST from higher levels.  Further analysis 
demonstrates that technological aids to the FiST are not as 
important as suspected.  Task saturation does not appear to 
be a significant cause of mission failure.  Finally, FiSTs, 
as currently constructed, fail in an ECO environment in the 
first fifteen days. 
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The reader is cautioned that the computer models presented 
in the research have not been exercised for all cases of 
interest.  While every effort has been made within the time 
available to ensure that the programs are free of 
computation and logical errors, they cannot be considered 
validated.  Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Marine units commonly take responsibility for larger battle 
spaces in counterinsurgency warfare and stability 
operations than a larger unit would take in conventional 
operations.  This expansion of responsibility at the lower 
levels of the Marine Corps requires a rethinking of how 
command and control is practiced throughout the  
Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps‟ response to this challenge 
is to develop practices that will enable Marines to perform 
what it has dubbed Enhanced Operations (EO).  The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps identified Fire Support as a 
key area in which significant change and experimentation 
must occur. 
 This research utilizes an agent-based simulation tool, 
a deterministic fatigue model, and a discrete-event model 
to evaluate the effects of Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMPLPF) policies on the effectiveness of the Fire 
Support process for a Company Landing Team (CLT) 
participating in Enhanced Company Operations (ECO).  In an 
ECO environment, the CLT has only a limited communications 
connection with the higher commander that doctrinally 
coordinates fire support activities between subordinate 
units and with supporting agencies.  Further, the CLT may 
be responsible for a very large amount of area, and have 
different types of enemy units and terrain to contend with 
over an extended period of time.  The CLT‟s Fire Support 
Team (FiST) has to operate under these conditions, and 
possibly with expanded authority to redress the 
communications shortfall. 
 xxvi 
This research examines the ability of the proposed ECO 
FiST to sustain performance in a mid-intensity environment.  
Additionally, this research identifies the factors that 
contribute most to FiST effectiveness.  The results of this 
research provide DOTMLPF recommendations for the  
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) to use as it continues 
to develop its ECO and Enhanced Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) Operations (EMO) experiments. 
 MCWL generated the scenario studied in this research.  
The scenario depicts low- to mid-intensity combat in the 
area of Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 29 Palms.  
The enemy force has the ability to conduct indirect fire, 
plant improvised explosive devices, and move about the 
battle space with a limited motorized capability.  The CLT 
is limited to foot patrols within an Area of Operations 
(AO), though it possesses countermortar radar and various 
unmanned aerial systems.  Additionally, there are two 
reconnaissance teams operating beyond the bounds of the 
CLT‟s AO.  The distillation of this scenario, incorporated 
into the Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) simulation 
environment, models where, how frequently, and for how long 
the CLT is able to gain and maintain contact with  
enemy units. 
State-of-the-art, Design of Experiment (DOE) 
principles guide the execution of this research through the 
three models.  This enables the researcher to efficiently 
determine which policies are most effective under a wide 
variety of conditions.  The design factors in this 
experiment are the size and scope of the FiST‟s 
responsibility, the capacity of the FiST, the activity 
policy of the FiST, and the fire-support structure of the 
 xxvii 
FiST.  The noise factors are the difficulty of traversing 
the terrain, the concealment offered by the terrain, the 
effect of atmospheric conditions on sensors, and the 
ability of the enemy to conceal their activities.  The 
final design matrix consists of 680 design points. 
The design matrix guided 68,000 simulated ECO 
missions.  The researcher‟s analysis of the output data 
provided valuable insight into the issues explored.  The 
analytical results of this exploration will help planners 
at MCWL as they develop future EO experiments and doctrine.  
Specific findings, based on the scenario examined, include: 
 As currently constituted, a FiST will fail to 
meet performance expectations within the first 
fifteen days of employment. 
 Task saturation is not a significant cause of 
mission failure. 
 The most important policy decision that can be 
implemented is to delegate weapons clearance 
authority to the FiST. 
 The addition of Command and Control (C2) 
equipment does not appear to be a significant 
factor in overall performance. 
 FiST rest and responsibility policies do not 
appear to have a significant effect on 
performance. 
Follow-on work can both improve and expand on this 
research: 
 Using the most up-to-date information from 
training commands, the models can be made more 
accurate. 
 More efficient software packages could improve 
the modeling of fatigue. 
 The model can be expanded to analyze EMO. 
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The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is conducting 
experiments to test and refine concepts that will allow 
future small units to take on a variety of missions and 
tasks that are currently assigned to larger units.  This 
concept started life under the rubric of Distributed 
Operations (DO), as it envisioned small units, scattered 
over a very large area, undertaking missions below the 
threshold of major combat operations.  As this concept 
matured, its name changed as well, and it is now referred 
to as Enhanced Operations (EO) (United States Marine Corps 
[USMC], 2008).  No matter the name, the goal is for the 
Marine Corps to do more with less. 
MCWL is currently experimenting with Enhanced Company 
Operations (ECO), wherein an infantry company is designated 
as a Company Landing Team (CLT) (USMC, 2008).  This CLT is 
assigned a mission where it operates over 100 miles from 
its higher headquarters, which reduces the level of 
communications between them.  This separation forces the 
CLT to take on more responsibility for the coordination of 
assets that traditionally resided in the battalion or 
higher levels of command.  The goal of MCWL‟s experiments 
is to identify the changes to Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) that are necessary to enable a CLT to succeed 
(USMC, 2008). 
 One of the key coordinating tasks that a CLT will have 
to take on is the control of fire support assets that are 
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the doctrinal responsibility of the battalion Fire Support 
Coordination Center (FSCC). According to Commandant Conway,  
Of all the applications of Marine Corps 
Operations in Complex and Distributed 
Environments [sic], fires might be that which 
requires the most immediate attention of our 
doctrine writers.  With battalions, even 
companies, operating over hundreds of miles and 
beyond the limits of mutual support, a fresh look 
at control measures and procedures is required.  
(USMC, 2008, p. 4) 
This research attempts to find robust solutions to 
this challenge of maximizing the effectiveness of the CLT‟s 
use of fire support assets over a wide variety of 
conditions. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps doctrinally deploys its forces as 
Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).  A MAGTF consists 
of four separate elements: 
1. The Ground Combat Element (GCE), which is 
typically built around an infantry battalion and 
is given additions of artillery, armor, and other 
specialized ground units. 
2. The Air Combat Element (ACE), which is typically 
built around a tilt rotor squadron and receives 
additional aircraft types such as heavy lift, 
helicopter gunships, and jet aircraft, as well as 
unmanned aerial systems (UASs) and additional 
command and control (C2) capabilities. 
3. The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) provides the 
logistical support for the MAGTF. 
4. Finally, the Command Element (CE) provides the 
overall command, control, and coordination of  
the MAGTF. 
MAGTFs are created to support a wide variety of 
operations ranging from disaster relief through major 
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combat operations.  The MAGTF just described is a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is embarked on shipping and 
is often the first American military presence on the scene 
for anything short of major combat operations.  The MAGTF 
can be scaled up or down from a MEU by replacing the 
components with larger or smaller echelons.  Additionally, 
specialized attachments can be added to custom tailor a 
MAGTF for specific operations. 
 Despite the wide range of missions that a MEU 
typically executes, subordinate units rely heavily on 
higher echelons for most of the coordination necessary to 
accomplish their individual tasks.  This process works well 
in situations where communications are easy and units are 
in close proximity, which allows them to mutually support 
each other.  However, in cases where communications are 
more difficult, or units are dispersed, coordination and 
mutual support suffers (USMC, 2008). 
1. The Fire Support Team (FiST) 
 The Company Commander is responsible for coordination 
of his fires and organizes his personnel accordingly.  The 
FiST is the agency that assists the Company Commander in 
coordinating and controlling fires. 
a. The Current Fire Support Team (FiST) 
 The present-day FiST employs supporting arms 
(mortars, artillery, and aviation ordnance) to support the 
company‟s scheme of maneuver.  These arms are controlled by 
artillery and mortar Forward Observers (FOs), a Forward Air 
Controller (FAC), and a Naval Gunfire (NGF) spotter.  “The 
Company Commander may assign an officer as the company Fire 
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Support Coordinator (FSC) to coordinate supporting arms 
with the company‟s scheme of maneuver” (USMC, 2001, p.  
1-6).  This organization of personnel, while not explicitly 
doctrinal, has nonetheless evolved into the FiST.  
Typically, the officer assigned to be the company FSC, or 
FiST leader, is either the Company Executive Officer (XO) 
or the Weapons Platoon Commander.  In addition to the 
principals named above, several Radio Operators (ROs) 
augment the FiST.  These ROs bring sufficient types and 
numbers of radios to monitor all of the necessary fire 
support and coordination nets.  While FiSTs have 
experimented with various technical aids to enhance 
coordination and weapons accuracy, the baseline for 
training still relies on the Marines utilizing paper maps 
and compasses to execute fire support tasks. 
The FiST‟s employment of supporting arms, either 
individually or in combination, is subject to the approval 
of the Battalion FSCC.  Thus, when the FiST begins the 
process of engaging a target, the actual employment of 
fires is still subject to the FSCC‟s final approval.  The 
FiST also conducts fire support planning in conjunction 
with the Battalion FSCC for future operations. 
b. The Fire Support Team (FiST) in Enhanced 
Company Operations (ECO) 
 The role of the FiST expands significantly in 
ECO.  MCWL envisions the FiST being responsible not only 
for selecting targets, but also for coordinating all 
aspects of the engagement.  Thus, the FiST is the final 
approval authority for weapon‟s release.  Additionally, the 
FiST will take on the FSCC‟s planning and coordinating 
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responsibilities, not only for their CLT, but also for any 
friendly forces operating in the CLT‟s Area of Influence 
(AI).  For the purpose of this research, MCWL has selected 
a different composition for the FiST to reflect the nature 
of ECO.  An artillery Fire Support Officer (FSO), a mortar 
FO, three Joint Fires Observers (JFOs), and a Joint 
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) comprise the FiST, in 
addition to the company FSC.  The JFOs are capable of 
calling in and directing mortars and artillery, as well as 
spotting targets for aircraft.  The JTAC does the same job 
as a FAC, but is typically an enlisted Marine.  
Additionally, the battalion may choose to augment this FiST 
with one of its FACs.  Several ROs support the FiST with 
the necessary array of radios.  Despite these changes, the 
baseline for the CLT FiST is still going to rely on the 
same map and compass skills. 
2. The Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 
The Battalion FSCC performs fire support 
coordination in terms of closely integrating 
multiple supporting arms with maneuver.  It 
monitors and receives all fire support requests 
originating within the battalion.  The battalion 
FSCC ensures that supporting arms are integrated 
with the scheme of maneuver and that friendly 
forces are not endangered.  It may also 
coordinate missions for observers to attack 
targets outside the battalion‟s zone of action.  
(USMC, 2001, p. 1-5) 
a. The Current Fire Support Coordination Center 
(FSCC) 
 The FSCC is the final approval authority within 
the battalion for the use of supporting arms.  It also 
coordinates with other friendly units to integrate the 
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effects of fires.  Additionally, the FSCC has the ability 
to engage targets on its own initiative.  As part of its 
responsibilities, it monitors both the radio nets used for 
requesting fires as well as the radio nets on which the 
battalion‟s units report their positions.  This monitoring 
enables the FSCC to deconflict fires on the battlefield 
throughout the battalion‟s battle space, and to protect 
friendly units from the inadvertent effects of friendly 
fires. 
b. The Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 
in Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) 
 In ECO, MCWL envisions that the FSCC likely will 
not perform its traditional mission due to the difficulties 
in communication over large distances.  Distance and 
terrain would degrade the FiST‟s ability to monitor the 
Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 
radio nets, while satellite communications (SATCOM) is 
likely to remain limited in the foreseeable future.  If the 
FiST cannot monitor the VHF and UHF nets, it cannot 
maintain the necessary situational awareness to perform its 
doctrinal tasks.  A possible result of this is that the 
FSCC will remain aboard the amphibious shipping, where it 
would work with the ship‟s personnel in the Supporting Arms 
Coordination Center (SACC). 
C. OBJECTIVE STATEMENT 
The CLT FiST is expected to carry far greater 
responsibilities than its present-day counterpart does, and 
to do so without significant support from a higher echelon.  
This research examines the ability of the proposed ECO FiST 
to sustain performance across a prolonged period of time in 
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a mid-intensity environment.  Additionally, this research 
identifies the factors that contribute most to FiST 
effectiveness.  The results of this research will provide 
DOTMLPF recommendations for MCWL to use as it continues to 
develop its ECO and Enhanced MAGTF Operations (EMO) 
experiments. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions guide this research: 
 How long can the CLT FiST, as currently 
constituted, function in an enhanced environment? 
 How often will the CLT FiST fail to execute tasks 
due to task saturation? 
 What affects do various FSCC/SACC and FiST 
policies have on the FiST‟s ability to 
successfully accomplish its assigned tasks? 
 What additions to the CLT FiST‟s equipment have a 
positive effect on its ability to successfully 
accomplish its assigned tasks? 
 What FiST Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
have a positive effect on its ability to 
successfully accomplish its assigned tasks? 
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research immediately benefits MCWL.  The results 
enable MCWL to more narrowly define the fires component of 
its upcoming Limited Objective Experiment (LOE), so that 
they can build on the conclusions presented here.  
Consequently, MCWL can extract maximum value from its 
research as it continues to define ECO and EMO. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
 The researcher has broken this research into three 
phases (see Figure 1).  In the first phase, MCWL develops 
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an ECO scenario that resembles an upcoming LOE in its 
choice of location.  The scenario is a mid-intensity combat 
operation with an enemy force operating over a large area, 
while a CLT attempts to control a portion of the area.  
Concurrently, the researcher gathers data from training 
commands throughout the Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
commands have been asked to provide data on student 
performance and to make subject matter experts available 
for interviews.  The information developed in this research 
determines how long fires support agencies take to complete 
tasks, and also how many tasks they can coordinate 
simultaneously. 
 
Figure 1.   Research progresses from scenario 
development through final analysis.  The data from MANA is 
used to feed the SAFTE model and, subsequently, both 
support the discrete-event model.  Additionally, data from 
training commands is also used.  The results of the 
discrete-event model are analyzed to provide the basis for 
the researcher‟s conclusions. 
Design of Experiments (DOE) principles guides the 
execution of this experiment, starting with the second 
phase.  This ensures that the problem space is adequately 
explored, while at the same time efficiently using limited 
resources.  The scenario is modeled and run in an agent-
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based simulation tool called Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata 
(MANA).  In simplest terms, the MANA scenario 
stochastically generates interactions between CLT and enemy 
forces in an intuitively plausible fashion.  The output 
from MANA is used to generate an arrival distribution of 
specific events that the CLT FiST might have to deal with.  
Additionally, the analyzed output provides a distribution 
representing how long the CLT can maintain contact with an 
enemy unit once it has detected it.  This information 
provides the final phase of the research. 
 In phase three, the researcher evaluates the endurance 
and performance of the FiST over time for each design 
point, based on the factors present and the output from 
phase two.  The research uses the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, 
and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) model (Hursh, et al., 2003) 
to perform this analysis.  The researcher takes these 
results and uses them to construct a discrete-event model 
that is supported by the information gathered in all the 
previous phases.  The discrete-event model is used to 
analyze the overall effects of the variables on the CLT 
FiST.  The analysis of the data from this phase concludes 
the research. 
 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Multiple Marine Corps publications describe the tasks 
that both the FSCC and FiST are to perform in combat.  
However, the performance metrics of these tasks are written 
in ambiguous terms.  FSCC and FiST are to “Execute fires to 
achieve effective combined arms employment in support of 
[the] company commander‟s scheme of maneuver/concept of 
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operations during both daylight and limited visibility” 
(Department of the Navy, 2005, pp. 4-49). 
MCWL did conduct an experiment to determine how to 
construct a CLT FiST, but its focus was on internal 
procedures and relationships between FiST members (Sullivan 
et al., 2010).  However, the data provided by this MCWL 
study are not useful for the purposes of this research as 
it is not statistically significant, owing to the limited 
number of trials and the fact that all of the members of 
the experimental FiST were infantry officers and not the 
usual mix of Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and 
ranks found in a FiST.  A further MCWL experiment in Hawaii 
evaluated a CLT in action, and raised concerns about the 
ability of the FiST to coordinate and deconflict fires with 
a distant SACC (Donnely et al., 2010).  Both MCWL reports 
emphasize the need for further study of the CLT FiST. 
Recently, researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) used the SAFTE model in conjunction with the Fatigue 
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) to determine optimum 
manning for a task.  They did this by constructing an 
optimization problem that specified a minimum level of 
performance from the workers (Tvaryanas and Miller, 2010).  
The nature of optimization solutions limits the 
applicability of this arrangement, however, as it assumes 
the external conditions are known and remain static 
throughout the duration of the mission. 
 A more robust solution to a manning and workload 
problem was presented by using a discrete-event model to 
represent the workload of computer specialists for the 
Turkish Air Force (Camur, 2009).  The researcher provided a 
by using simulation over a range of conditions.  However, 
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the nature of their simulation and the tasks that they were 
modeling did not require them to study fatigue effects on 
performance.  Additionally, the arrival rates for events in 
the discrete-event model were arbitrarily chosen. 
 This research builds on both of these previous works, 
while answering the questions MCWL has posed.  Fatigue 
modeling is incorporated into a discrete-event model to 
evaluate performance under a range of circumstances.  
Additionally, the arrival process of events in the 
discrete-event model is based on data-farming principles 
from an agent-based simulation.  This enables the 
researcher to find solutions that are effective over a wide 
range of conditions. 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter describes the scenario and models used in 
this research.  Additionally, the researcher describes in 
detail the assumptions and abstractions made for each of 
the models. 
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
1. Overview 
 The researcher and representatives of the Experiments 
Division at MCWL developed a scenario that takes place in a 
mid-intensity combat environment at the Marine Corps Air 
Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) in Twentynine Palms, 
California.   
2. General Situation 
 An insurgent force known as the Reds has been detected 
operating in the area of Twentynine Palms, also known as 29 
Palms (see Figures 2 and 3).  They have driven off any 
local authority that might have challenged them and are now 
terrorizing the populace.  The nearest MEU has been tasked 
to stabilize the situation.  This MEU only has one CLT that 
can respond to the crisis, as the other two are tasked with 
similar challenges.  The CLT‟s mission is to secure an area 
of 29 Palms until follow-on forces can arrive at an 
undetermined time in the future to relieve them and restore 









Figure 2.   The above is a standard 1:50,000 map of 
MCAGCC 29 Palms and the surrounding area.  The area marked 




Figure 3.   This is the MANA rendering of the same area 
as shown in Figure 2.  The dark brown areas are elevations, 
the grey rectangles are urban terrain, and the yellow bands 
are the road network.  Since MANA does not handle irregular 
boundaries well, a circle has been utilized to represent 
the Quackenbush Range.  The blue flags are a MANA artifact 
and should be ignored. 
3. Special Situation 
a. Enemy 
 The Reds are a mixed force of infantry and 
motorized assets.  They can put together a force of four 
motorized squads, four infantry squads, two improvised 
explosive device (IED) teams, three surface-to-air-missile 
(SAM) teams, and two mortar teams.  There are additional 
supporters of the Reds who will emplace victim-activated 
IEDs (VIEDs).  Their infantry and motorized units have 
access to modern small arms, medium machineguns, and 
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rocket-propelled grenades.  Additionally, their motorized 
units have technical vehicles that mount heavy machineguns.  
Their IED teams are armed similarly to their infantry 
squads, but have the ability to use command-detonated IEDs 
to initiate ambushes.  Red mortar teams are armed with  
low-caliber mortars and are mounted in vehicles.  SAM teams 
are armed with SA-7, -14, or -16 man-portable air-defense 
systems (MANPADS).  Red forces have cell phones and the 
ability to contact each other for support.  Additionally, 
Red forces have access to commercially acquired night 
vision devices and binoculars. 
 Red infantry units focus on defending the area 
around their supply caches and the local area.  Red 
motorized units patrol the outlying villages, usually 
stopping in them for variable lengths of time to extract 
money and supplies from the locals.  IED teams and 
emplacers typically target known routes of CLT forces.  Red 
mortar teams focus on harassing CLT forces and supporting 
their infantry and motorized units.  SAM teams protect the 
area around the supply caches and also accompany motorized 
patrols. 
 Red force tactics emphasize harassment of the CLT 
forces and the local population.  Red forces are cognizant 
of the CLT‟s ability to use combined arms effectively in 
combat, and thus they do not fight CLT forces for longer 
than fifteen minutes before attempting to break contact and 
escape.  Mortar teams and VIED emplacers always immediately 
seek to get away from CLT forces, while infantry, IED 




typically retreat to their supply caches and rest areas 
near the Quackenbush Range on MCAGCC, 29 Palms, before 
venturing forth again. 
b. Friendly 
 The CLT is responsible for an area of operations 
(AO) that consists of the Quackenbush Range aboard 29 Palms 
(see Figure 4).  A helicopter and tilt-rotor insertion 
positions the CLT in the Quackenbush Range complex.  A CLT 
is composed of nine rifle squads and three weapons squads.  
In this scenario, the CLT‟s commander has attached the 
weapons squads to the rifle squads.  The CLT is equipped 
with rifles, light and medium machineguns, rocket-
launchers, and 60mm mortars.  The EMAGTF has given the CLT 
as attachments a section of four M252 81mm mortars, an 
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) 120mm mortar, and 
a FAC to supplement their JTAC.  Besides the vehicle 
designed to transport the EFSS, there are no other vehicles 
with the CLT.  In addition to weapons, the CLT has two  
MQ-9b Raven UAS suites with three Ravens each, and an 
AN/TPQ-48 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR).  The CLT 
has sufficient communications to contact the MAGTF and any 
unit within the 29 Palms area. 
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Figure 4.   This image of the MANA battlefield displays 
the position of the Red forces at the start of scenario.  
They are gathered around their cache sites from which they 
will begin to penetrate the Quackenbush Range on the axis 
corresponding to the red arrows.  The exceptions to this 
are the technical vehicles, which will take clockwise or 
counterclockwise paths between the urban areas (shaded  
in gray). 
The MAGTF remains located aboard the amphibious 
ready group (ARG) 150 nautical miles (nm) west of the  
29 Palms area.  The MAGTF has allocated two reconnaissance 
teams to operate in the 29 Palms AI.  These teams are armed 
and equipped identically to the infantry squads and possess 
sufficient communications to contact either the CLT or the 
MAGTF.  The MAGTF operates a UAS of its own that can 
support the CLT, as well as AV-8b Harrier Jets and AH-1Z 
attack helicopters to provide close air support (CAS). 
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Additionally, the MAGTF provides casualty evacuation 
(CASEVAC) and resupply with its MV-22 Ospreys and CH-53E 
helicopters, respectively. 
CLT units patrol the Quackenbush Range and 
attempt to gain and maintain contact with any Red forces 
they detect.  The CLT maintains a quick reaction force 
(QRF) to either reinforce patrols that are in contact or to 
investigate sightings by other sensors.  The CLT conducts 
an average of four squad-sized patrols per day, but at most 
only two patrols are available at any one time.  Patrols 
last approximately six hours.  The QRF is always available.  
The reconnaissance (recon) teams patrol the areas outside 
of the Quackenbush Range.  They are inserted into a patrol 
area by air assets for a period of six days, at the end of 
which they return to the ARG to rest and refit for two days 
before being inserted into a new patrol area. 
4. Mission 
 The CLT‟s mission is to prevent the Red forces from 
consolidating their hold over the 29 Palms region. 
5. Execution 
CLT and recon team tactics focus on gaining and 
maintaining contact with Red units so as to utilize 
supporting arms to defeat them. 
6. Administration and Logistics 
 The MAGTF will resupply the CLT by air on a daily 
basis shortly after sunset.  Recon teams will be resupplied 
every two days. 
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7. Command and Signal 
 The MAGTF headquarters is located aboard ARG shipping.  
The other CLTs assigned to the MAGTF are pursuing separate 
missions, but this CLT is the main effort and has priority 
of support and fires.  All requests for aviation fires, 
resupply, and CASEVAC will go to the MAGTF.  The MAGTF will 
issue directives to the CLT and recon teams on how to 
coordinate their operations.  The FSCC will remain in the 
SACC.  The CLT will maintain a common operational picture 
of all activities in the AO and AI at their headquarters.  
The CLT FiST will be located in the CLT headquarters with 
access to all information. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MANA MODEL 
 A full description of MANA and its capabilities is 
available from the MANA version 4 User’s Manual and MANA-V 
Supplementary Manual.  Both manuals are available from the 
New Zealand Defense Technology Agency and also on the 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center 
website at NPS (http://harvest.nps.edu/). 
The researcher chose MANA to support this research 
because it provides an accessible environment in which to 
model agents that change their behavior based on changing 
conditions, which they either detect or receive input on 
from their allies.   Additionally, a user can set the 
output controls on MANA to receive the data that is 
necessary for his or her research.  Finally, common 
spreadsheet programs are able to easily work with the 
output data from MANA, enabling a researcher to refine the 
data that he or she may need, even if MANA does not return 
it in the desired format. 
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MANA is a time-step, stochastic model in which agents 
base their actions in each time step on what they see, what 
their allies see, and their preprogrammed behaviors.  In 
addition, based on external or internal stimuli, these 
behaviors themselves can change, giving the agent a 
different “personality” under different conditions.  An 
example in this model is the Red command wire-IED (CW-IED) 
team.  While this agent approaches its destination, it is 
wary of Blue forces and attempts to avoid any that it sees.  
However, once the CW-IED team arrives at its target, its 
behavior changes.  It now sets up an ambush and lays in 
wait for a Blue agent to come close enough to detonate its 
IED (McIntosh, et al., 2007).   
1. Goal 
 The goal of the MANA simulation is to determine the 
frequency with which the CLT and EMAGTF detect enemy forces 
and how long they are able to maintain contact with those 
forces.  This depends on the temporal and spatial 
relationship between the Red and the Blue forces.  The MANA 
simulation models the CLT in their AO and AI after they 
have been inserted and set up their base in the Quackenbush 
Range region of 29 Palms.  The response variables we are 
interested in are where and at what times Red units are 
detected, and how long the CLT is able to maintain contact 
with those units.  The variables that will be varied in the 
MANA model are the traficability of the terrain, the amount 
of concealment it provides, the ability of the Red force to 
camouflage its infantry forces, and sensor effectiveness. 
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2. Conceptual Model 
 The MANA model is essentially a large-scale game of 
freeze tag.  The CLT and EMAGTF forces are “it” while the 
Red forces attempt to accomplish tasks without being 
detected and “tagged.”  Based on their missions, some Red 
forces, if “tagged,” will “freeze” in place for a period of 
time before running away, while others will immediately 
seek to escape from the CLT forces upon sighting them. 
3. Terrain and Scale 
 The model takes place in the area occupied by MCAGCC 
29 Palms and adjacent land (refer to Figures 2 and 3).  The 
battlefield chosen is 80 kilometers (km) along the  
east-west axis and 60 km from north to south, centered on 
the Quackenbush training area.  The terrain throughout the 
area is high desert, with large flat areas cut by dry 
stream beds and light scrub.  There are few hills, but 
several sharp ridges that can rise over a thousand feet 
above the surrounding terrain.  These ridges are extremely 
difficult to traverse.   A network of all weather roads 
connects most regions of MCAGCC 29 Palms.  The numerous 
urban combat ranges, the two airfields, and the CLT base 
itself represent villages on the scenario map.  The urban 
combat ranges and one of the airfields are relocated, so as 
to ensure a larger spread of habitation and to spur 
behaviors in the model.  These additional villages are 
connected to the road network.  The urban areas are not 
modeled in any detail except for the fact that they provide 
concealment and slow movement.  Elevations on the 
battlefield range from 1,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level. 
 23 
 The time scale of events is set such that every model 
time step equals one minute.  This is an important 
selection, as the output that is being sought would be in 
minutes and, more importantly, the time step limit of MANA 
is 100,000 steps.  Eighty-six thousand four hundred steps 
provide two months‟ worth of simulation time, with the 
proper amount of detail needed in the discrete-event model.  
However, the number of time steps means that a single run 
of the MANA scenario takes about an hour to complete on a 
modern processor. 
4. Red Force 
 Each Red agent represents a different capability.  
These capabilities are foot patrols, motorized patrols, 
indirect fire IDF teams, VIED emplacement teams, and CW-IED 
teams.  All of these units start off at one of the four Red 
force supply caches surrounding, but outside, the 
Quackenbush Range (see Figure 4).  The foot patrols attempt 
to occupy areas in and around the immediate vicinity of the 
Quackenbush Range for one day before moving to a new 
location.  The motorized patrols follow a similar pattern, 
but they patrol through the outlying villages, staying in 
them for up to two days.  The IDF teams initially begin 
operations by shelling the CLT base, though they will 
support Red units that request assistance.  The VIED teams 
proceed through a series of waypoints and emplace an IED at 
each one for approximately a week, before digging it up and 
moving it to a better position.  The CW-IED teams behave 
much as the VIED teams, except they move after a shorter 
period of time if they have not engaged a target. 
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5. Blue Force (CLT and Recon) 
 The Blue forces start patrolling at the start of the 
scenario (see Figure 5).  The CLT patrols remain within the 
boundary of the Quackenbush Range and last approximately 
six hours if contact is not made with the enemy.  The MQ-9s 
patrol out to a radius of 10 km from the base for an hour 
each.  The Shadow UAS is unlimited by any range 
restriction, but is limited to approximately two hours of 
fuel.  The recon teams operate beyond the border of the 
Quackenbush Range for a period of six days before returning 
to the base to rest and refit for two days.  They are then 
inserted into another section of the area outside the 





Figure 5.   This version of the MANA map displays the 
starting positions of the CLT and recon teams.  The dashed 
black circle represents the limits of the CLT‟s AO.  All of 
the CLT units start near the center of the circle and 
execute random patrol patterns until their patrols expire.  
At that time, they return to the center to rest or refuel.  
The recon teams spend six days roaming the general area 
they are inserted into before being extracted by helicopter 
to rest. 
6. Logistical Support 
 The Red force resupplies and rests its forces at one 
of the four supply caches surrounding the Quackenbush Range 
complex.  Red forces spend between one and three days 
resting before venturing back out on their missions.  Blue 
forces are all resupplied from their base in the 
Quackenbush Range.  The amount of time required to rest and 
resupply varies depending on the unit type. 
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7. Data Sources, Abstractions, Assumptions, and 
Validations 
 Data for this scenario was primarily developed from 
the researcher‟s own experiences in the Marine Corps, 
specifically at 29 Palms and in Afghanistan.  The data 
inputs were discussed with MCWL to ensure that they 
considered them valid.  Since weapons accuracy and effects 
are not being modeled except as far as their use would spur 
behavior by the agents, only the essential details are 
incorporated into the model.  The researcher and MCWL also 
discussed the details of the various units‟ behaviors and 
responses to ensure that they conformed to real-world 
experience. 
 In order to start work on this model, numerous 
assumptions had to be made.  Each of these was discussed 
with MCWL at length to ensure that they were realistic and 
would not adversely affect the data that was being 
gathered.  These assumptions are: 
1. Both the insurgents and Marines can replace their 
losses seamlessly and without any loss of 
capability. 
2. The civilian population will avoid interactions 
with both Red and Blue agents. 
3. No manned air assets will conduct intelligence, 
surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR), as the 
Enhanced Marine Air Ground Task Force (EMAGTF) 
needs them for CAS. 
4. The Marines have a base chance of 70% to detect 
an IED and avoid detonation (modified by 
terrain). 
5. Communications between all units are perfect. 
6. Any CW-IED will be part of a complex ambush. 
7. Red forces will only maintain contact up to 
fifteen minutes, and then seek to retreat in 
order to avoid supporting arms. 
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8. The Red forces always know where the CLT base is. 
9. Red supply caches cannot be detected. 
10. Red forces that are resupplying are assumed to be 
hiding in caves and are undetectable. 
11. The Red force has access to night vision devices. 
12. The LCMR can detect all IDF fire within eight km 
of the CLT base. 
13. A UAS will move towards already located targets 
in preference to searching for targets. 
14. After being engaged and breaking contact, Red 
units spend time refitting before their next 
attack. 
 Since the goal of this model is target detection, a 
vast array of details that would normally have gone into 
modeling a large number of units were done away with.  
Additionally, many of these abstractions support the 
assumptions made above: 
1. All squads have only one agent. 
2. All agents are invulnerable. 
3. UASs are invisible. 
4. While the CLT has nine squads, work details, rest 
periods, and guard shifts result in only two 
being capable of patrolling at a time, with a 
third as the quick reaction force.  Thus, only 
three squads are modeled. 
5. While each MQ-9 suite has three Raven-Bs, there 
is only one control unit per suite, so only two 
MQ-9s are modeled. 
6. The base serves as the refuel and rest point for 
all USMC units, including the recon teams and 
Shadow UASs.  Once units are refueled, they 
become inert and invisible until their rest time 
has elapsed. 
7. Since the Red forces are expected to always know 
the location of the CLT base, an invisible 
observer is placed next to it.  This agent 
ensures that Red IDF teams can always target  
the base. 
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8. Red SAM teams are not modeled, but their presence 
is felt in the discrete-event model. 
9. The CLT and recon teams‟ weapons are only used to 
fire on IEDs that have been discovered in order 
to trigger the proper data output. 
10. Only the VIED, CW-IED, and IDF teams have 
functioning weapons.  The IDF teams‟ weapons 
serve to track the amount of IDF that patrols and 
the Blue base would receive.  For both types of 
IED teams, their weapons are only activated when 
emplaced.  Their weapons being discharged 
represent an IED detonating successfully against 
a USMC target. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAFTE MODEL 
 The SAFTE model was developed by Dr. Hursh for the 
Department of Defense.  It is designed to examine the 
effect of fatigue on cognitive task performance.  The model 
enables the researcher to specify a sleep schedule and 
conditions.  Figure 6 depicts the SAFTE model that  
Dr. Hursh describes thusly: 
The conceptual architecture of the SAFTE model is 
shown in Figure 1 [6].  The core of this model is 
schematized as a sleep reservoir which represents 
sleep-dependant processes that govern the 
capacity to perform cognitive work.  Under fully 
rested, optimal conditions, a person has a 
finite, maximal capacity to perform, annotated as 
the Reservoir Capacity, Rc [sic].  While one is 
awake, the actual „contents‟ of this reservoir 
are depleted and while asleep they are 
replenished.  Replenishment (Sleep Accumulation) 
is determined by Sleep Intensity and Sleep 
Quality.  Sleep Intensity is in turn governed by 
both the Time-of-Day (Circadian Process) and the 
current level of the reservoir (Sleep Debt).  
Sleep Quality is modeled as its continuity, or 
conversely, Fragmentation, in part determined by 
external, real-world demands, or requirements to 
perform.  Performance Effectiveness is the output 
of the modeled system.  The level of 
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Effectiveness is simultaneously modulated by 
Time-of-Day (Circadian) effects and the level of 
the Sleep Reservoir.  Transient post-sleep decay 
of performance is modeled by the term Inertia.  
(Hursh et al., 2003, p. 8) 
 
 
Figure 6.   The SAFTE model.  Effectiveness is a 
combination of the individual‟s circadian rhythm and the 
amount of sleep that has been stored in the sleep reservoir 
(From United States Air Force Research Laboratory, 2003, p. 
1). 
 SAFTE‟s metric for cognitive performance is based on 
sleep study participants‟ ability to complete cognitive 
tasks after certain amounts of sleep deprivation. 
While all of the tasks that the FiST executes 
would not necessarily fall neatly into the tasks 
performed by the laboratory participants, it is 
reasonable to assume that changes in military 
task performance would correlate with changes in 
the underlying cognitive task capacity.  (Hursh 
et al., 2003, p. 20) 
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Therefore, the researcher is using the predicted cognitive 
effectiveness from SAFTE as a proxy for the FiST‟s 
cognitive effectiveness in performing fire support tasks. 
1. Goal 
 The SAFTE model is used in this research to predict 
the expected performance of the FiST while it is deployed 
in the 29 Palms area.  This information is used to affect 
the performance of tasks within the discrete-event model.  
Additionally, fatigue effects are analyzed on their own.  
The particular effects are: 
1. The minimum effectiveness reached by a policy 
within the first 15 days. 
2. The minimum effectiveness reached within the 
first 30 days. 
3. The minimum effectiveness reached over the whole 
60 days. 
4. The mean effectiveness achieved in the first  
15 days. 
5. The mean effectiveness achieved in the first  
30 days. 
6. The mean effectiveness achieved over the whole  
60 days. 
2. Conceptual Model 
 This model is based on the concept that the FiST‟s 
effectiveness can be calculated by comparing the 
effectiveness of the FiST leader with that of the rest of 
the FiST.  The FiST leader is separated out from the rest 
of the FiST because he initiates each FiST mission and he 
gives final approval.  The researcher has aggregated the 




equally to all missions.  The overall effectiveness is 
calculated by taking the lesser of the FiST leader or the 
FiST‟s effectiveness. 
3. Data Sources, Abstractions, Assumptions, and 
Validations 
 The data that is input into the SAFTE model originates 
mostly from analyzing the results of the MANA model.  This 
information is analyzed to provide an arrival distribution 
for specific events that stimulate FiST activity.  Since 
SAFTE is a deterministic model, the expected values of the 
arrival distributions are used to create the arrivals; 
given more time, the actual distributions would be used.  
If the FiST is awake when an event arrives, there is no 
effect on their sleep schedule, except to possibly keep 
them up longer.  If the FiST is asleep, however, their 
sleep schedule will show them as having been woken up for 
the time necessary to deal with the event and immediately 
return to sleep.  The assumptions for the model are: 
1. Each event lasts one hour. 
2. The FiST attains asymptotic performance prior to 
going into action. 
3. The FiST receives eight hours of sleep each night 
for the previous three nights before employment. 
4. The FiST is able to sleep for eight hours unless 
woken for a FiST task. 
5. The FiST members have median sensitivity to sleep 
deprivation. 
Assumption 1 assigns an hour to each FiST task.  Most 
tasks themselves would take significantly less time, but 
the hour reflects the FiST not only dealing with the task 
at hand, but also looking for follow-up missions, 
collecting Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), debriefing 
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themselves and any outside agencies, and the myriad other 
small tasks that occur after an engagement. 
Assumption 2 posits that the FiST has trained 
extensively together for some time and has reached its peak 
performance level.  In one fatigue experiment, the 
researchers note that some aspects of performance continue 
to increase despite sleep deprivation (Elliot et al., 
2002).  One explanation offered for this is that the 
fatigue portion of most of these experiments typically 
lasts about 36 hours, and the teams are usually still 
learning and developing more efficient techniques to meet 
their performance goals before the experiment ends, which 
offsets the effects of fatigue (Chaiken et al., 2008).  
Learning and team task adaption are beyond the scope of 
this research, and Assumption 3 enables the researcher to 
keep the models focused on measuring the effect of fatigue 
on cognitive effectiveness. 
Assumption 4 is the most problematic, as it assumes 
that members of the FiST will not nap during their “awake” 
time.  In reality, a fatigued member of the FiST would 
likely be sent to rest and recuperate until he recovered 
sufficiently to fully contribute to the team.  However, a 
more dynamic model was beyond the capability of the 
researcher to develop in the time available for  
this research. 
Assumption 5 assumes that the CLT members have median 




in their susceptibility to sleep deprivation,1 median 
susceptibility provides an excellent baseline against which 
future comparisons can be made. 
The complexity of studying the effects of fatigue on a 
population, particularly a simulated population, requires a 
couple of abstractions to be made.  The first one is that 
no provision is made in the model for the FiST or a member 
of it to take a nap during their shift if they have not had 
sufficient sleep.  The second abstraction is that the only 
events that are tracked are fire-support events.  The rest 
of the FiST‟s activity and responsibilities are not 
modeled, including the time they would spend planning for 
missions with the SACC or adjacent units.  Both of these 
abstractions reduce the complexity of the fatigue model, 
which the researcher deems necessary due to the limited 
time to affect the full research project. 
 There are two limitations in the utilization of the 
fatigue model that deserve to be addressed.  SAFTE allows 
the researcher to set the degree to which the environment 
is conducive to sleep in addition to the quantity.  These 
settings are Excellent, Good, Fair, and Poor, and reflect 
an increasing number of interruptions that occur during 
each hour of sleep as the sleep environment degrades.  
These interruptions do not necessarily result in the 
individual awaking, but will adversely affect sleep 
quality.2  The researcher had initially planned to set the 
environment to Good or Fair before starting the research in 
                     
1 See built-in help file in FAST.  The key phrase is “percentile 
line.” 
2 See built-in help file in FAST.  The key phrase is “sleep 
environment.” 
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order to reflect the austere conditions that a CLT would 
endure.  However, FAST defaults to Excellent sleep with all 
new schedules.  There is no apparent way to change the 
sleep environment for a schedule as a whole, but rather 
each individual sleep segment has to have its sleep 
changed.  Since the nature of the experiment (see Chapter 
III) requires hundreds of inputs to FAST, the researcher 
decided that in the interest of completing this research in 
time, the default setting would remain in use.  This means 
that sleep deprivation will not have as drastic an effect 
as it might have had; that is the model is biased against 
fatigue being important. 
In a sleep study with live participants, the 
participants would wear wrist-worn activity monitors or 
actiwatches.  These watches would record the intensity of 
activity that participants are engaged in throughout the 
day, as well as the quality of sleep they are receiving.  
Since that is not possible with a simulation model, the 
FiST is only coded as awake or asleep during each model 
run, with no measure of intensity for either state.  This 
also reduces the accuracy of this fatigue model, and the 
experiment as a whole. 
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCRETE-EVENT MODEL 
A discrete event simulation only models events and 
actions that are of interest to the researcher.  Typically, 
this type of simulation is used to model processes where an 
event requires a process or processes to be performed on 
it.  The researcher chose to use a discrete-event model due 
to these characteristics. 
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1. Goal 
 The goal of the discrete-event model is to evaluate 
the CLT FiST‟s overall effectiveness.  The Measure of 
Effectiveness (MOE) measured is the percentage of enemy 
targets that are successfully engaged by the FiST. 
2. Conceptual Model 
 The basic conceptual design of the discrete-event 
model is centered on the arrival of targets and other 
events that would trigger FiST activity.  These events‟ 
arrival process is based on the data derived from the 
appropriate MANA scenario.  Events consist of IDF fire on 
the CLT‟s base, IED detonations, contact with Red units, 
and the arrival of the resupply and CASEVAC aircraft. 
 Once an event arrives, the model immediately 
determines where it occurs (see Figure 7).  If the event 
occurs in a zone for which the CLT is responsible, the 
event then proceeds to have additional information 
developed.  IDF fire on the CLT base occurs only in Zone 1.  
The arrival of resupply aircraft is scripted to occur at 
the CLT base after sunset each day, and it supports the 
individual recon teams on alternate days.  If the CLT FiST 
is not responsible for the recon team‟s resupply, the 
helicopter is not scripted to arrive for them. 
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Figure 7.   This map displays the overlays of the 
various engagement zones on the MANA map.  Each of the 
concentric circles is measured from the location of the 
CLT‟s base.  Zone 1 corresponds to the outer range of their 
81mm mortars, and Zone 2 consists of the urban areas within 
Zone 1.  Zone 3 is the abstract boundary of the Quackenbush 
Range used for this model.  Zone 5 is the outer range of 
the EFSS, while Zone 4 is an urban area within Zone 5.  
Zone 6 consists of all of the areas outside of the EFSS 
range ring. 
 For an IED event, the model determines whether the 
device is discovered and deactivated by the Marines or it 
detonates.  In the latter case, a CASEVAC is triggered that 
the CLT FiST has to coordinate in addition to their other 
tasks.  Additionally, the model determines if the IED was 
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command detonated as part of an ambush or if it is a VIED.  
In the former case, this results in an immediate follow-on 
engagement with the ambush force.  A further check is made, 
based on the location of the encounter, to determine 
whether an enemy IDF team supports the ambush.  If the 
event is an encounter with Red technical vehicles or 
infiltrators, the only check made is whether RED IDF teams 
fire in support of them. 
 Once the details about each event are determined, any 
contact with an enemy force has its duration determined 
based on a combination of the zone in which it occurs and 
the enemy unit type (technical vehicle, IDF team, etc.).  
At this point, the event is put in the queue for service by 
the FiST.  As it moves to be serviced, the model checks the 
FiST‟s predicted cognitive effectiveness based on the time 
in the model.  The FiST‟s time to service the event is 
multiplied by the inverse of the cognitive effectiveness in 
order to reflect the affects of fatigue (Hursh et al., 
2003).  Based on the target‟s location and composition, the 
FiST will engage it with a certain mix of weaponry.  As the 
FiST services the event, it may find a need for CASEVAC or 
CAS aircraft.  These assets take time to arrive in the 
AI/AO, and also have a limited time that they can remain on 
station before they have to return to the ARG (see Chapter 
II.D.3).  One of the underlying assumptions of the scenario 
is that the Red forces have MANPADs.  Thus, in all cases 
that the CLT FiST utilizes CAS, it will also make use of 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) fires from the 
81mm mortar or EFSS, depending on the location of  
the target. 
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 If an enemy target‟s contact duration expires before 
the FiST finishes engaging it, the target will be 
considered to have reneged.  In this case, the target is 
considered to have successfully escaped engagement by the 
FiST, and will be recorded as such.  If the target has not 
reneged by the time the FiST finishes, the target will be 
considered to have been successfully engaged, and will be 
tallied as a successful mission.  The MOE of this 
experiment is the percentage of total targets successfully 
engaged by the FiST.  Figure 8 is an event graph of this 
conceptual model (Law & Kelton, 1982). 
 
Figure 8.   The event graph diagram of the discrete-
event model.  The model assigns attributes to each event, 
including the renege time of the event.  The event then 
moves to Start Service, where it may renege if it waits too 
long for service.  From Start Service, it is acted on by 
the FiST and fire support agencies.  Once the event arrives 
at End of Service (EOS), it is determined if the event was 
successfully serviced before it reneged. 
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 The finished model in ExtendSim7 (see Figure 9) is 
broken into four primary parts (Imagine That!, 2007).  The 
images from ExtendSim7 are hard to read due to the scope 
and complexity of the model, but the researcher has 
included them because of the insight they can provide into 
the structure of the discrete-event model.   In the first 
part (see Figure 10), events arrive and have their 
attributes assigned to them.  Further, each event is 
assigned a serial number for use in tracking and, if 
necessary, CAS aircraft are requested to engage the 
appropriate targets.  The second part of the ExtendSim7 
model is the fire-support process.  The structure of this 
part of the model varies with the selection of the fire-
support process (see Chapter III).  Due the four different 
choices of the fire-support process, this section of the 
model is distinct for each one (Figure 11 shows the model 
for centralized fire support, Fire-Support Process One).  
Additionally, coding of attribute assignments in the 
arrival section of the model also varies due to the exact 
fire-support process in use.  Events that enter this part 
of the model enter a queue until the FiST can address them.  
Once the event leaves the queue, it is checked to see if it 
reneges.  If it does not, it takes resources such as the 
FiST‟s capacity and weapon systems while the event is being 
serviced.  The third part of the model (see Figure 12) is 
the postprocess after the fire support section.  In this 
part, events are regrouped together, and resources are 
released.  At the end of it, an equation determines if 
service is completed before the event would have reneged, 
in order to determine how the event is counted in the 
fourth and final part of the model.  The fourth part of the 
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model (see Figure 12) is the output.  Here data is 
organized to be output into an Excel spreadsheet  
for analysis. 
 
Figure 9.   ExtendSim7 Fire-Support Model.  The solid 
polygon encloses the arrival process, the dashed rectangle 
the fire-support process, the solid oval the post process, 
and the dotted polygon the output.  Note the output module 
























Figure 10.   The fire-support model arrival process.  The 
solid oval encloses the area where events requiring a CAS 
aircraft request air support.  The dashed oval indicates 
where events receive their serial number for tracking and 
matching purposes.  As events arrive at each entry, a 
determination of their zone is made, followed by the 

















Figure 11.   Fire-Support Process One (see Chapter III).  
The solid L-shape encloses the FiST and the blocks that 
modify its performance based on its fatigue.  The upper 
solid oval is the CAS process, while the lower is the EFSS 
and 81mm process. 
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Figure 12.   The postprocess and the output sections.  
The solid oval encloses the the postprocess, where events 
are batched, resources are released, and successful 
completion is checked.  Events then proceed to the 
appropriate output and are then broken down by event type, 
and the time in the model (first 15 days, first 30 days, 
and first 60 days). 
3. Data Sources, Abstractions, Assumptions, and 
Validations 
 The input data for the discrete-event simulation comes 
from many sources.  The researcher provides the data on 
targets from the output analysis of the MANA model.  The 
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researcher also uses the output analysis of the SAFTE model 
to provide the fatigue inputs.  Data on task performance is 
contributed by the units supporting this research (see 
Chapter IV.A).  Some of the necessary information has to be 
assumed as the researcher could not locate it, particularly 
information on SACC and mortar performance.  In this case, 
the researcher relied on his own experience in training  
and combat. 
 SACC 
o Time to approve CAS mission is a Uniform (U) 
distribution with range 5-10 minutes. 
o Time to approve 81mm or EFSS mission U(2-3) 
minutes. 
o Time to approve SEAD U(6-15) minutes. 
 FiST 
o Develop and approve a mortar Call for Fire 
CFF U(2-5) minutes. 
o Develop a CAS 9-line U(2-10) minutes. 
o Pass a CAS 9-line to an aircraft and receive 
acknowledgement U(5-15). 
 81mm Mortars execute CFF U(2-5) minutes. 
 EFSS execute CFF U(3-6) minutes. 
 Fixed-Wing (F/W) CAS execute CAS 9-line after 
acknowledgement is Normal distribution(8.3, 3.9). 
 Assumptions: 
1. Firing agencies (CAS and mortars) can only 
prosecute one target at a time. 
2. If a target reneges while being processed, the 
FiST, SACC, and firing agencies still spend that 
amount of time attempting to prosecute the 
target. 
3. Observers can provide targeting information to 
the FiST in negligible amount of time. 
4. The FiST does not start a mission until it can 
devote sufficient resources to complete it. 
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5. Only fixed-wing aircraft are available for CAS 
due to the distance from the ARG. 
6. CAS aircraft have only twenty minutes of on-
station time. 
7. CAS aircraft return to the EMAGTF once the target 
is engaged or it reneges. 
8. CAS aircraft can only engage one target before 
they must return to the EMAGTF to rearm. 
9. CAS aircraft are only delivering bombs, not 
forward firing ordnance such as rockets or 
cannon. 
10. Aircraft are employed sequentially. 
11. Once Mortars are allocated to a target for SEAD, 
they cannot support other events. 
12. There is no target location error. 
13. The FiST has twenty minutes to respond to IDF. 
14. Resupply occurs at 1900 daily for the CLT.  This 
event lasts 30 minutes and includes the time the 
helicopter is being routed and manually 
offloaded. 
15. Resupply occurs at 2000 on alternate days for the 
recon teams.  The whole event lasts an hour as 
the aircraft enters the AI, lands, is unloaded by 
the team, takes off, and proceeds to the other 
team, and then repeats the process before 
departing the AO/AI. 
Assumption 1 is based on the fact that split section 
operations with 81mm mortars are seldom practiced, and the 
EFSS is a single tube.  It is assumed that the CAS aircraft 
will employ all of their ordnance in the attack on their 
target.  Assumption 2 assumes that if a target escapes 
while being prosecuted, the FiST and CLT will expend 
sufficient time trying to reacquire it that it would equal 
the time it would have taken to prosecute it.  Assumption 3 
posits that the time for a JFO to call in a target to be 
serviced is negligible.  Assumption 4 assumes that the FiST 
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will not start part of a mission if it cannot see it to 
completion.  Thus, a very complex mission requiring all of 
the FiST‟s attention will not be started even if some of 
their attention is made available. 
Assumption 5 is based on the distance to the ARG as 
stated by the scenario.  At 150 nm, any helicopter would 
take over an hour to reach the AO/AI, while fixed-wing 
aircraft could arrive much sooner (Marine Air Weapons and 
Tactics Squadron One [MAWTS-1], 2010).  Assumption 6 is 
based on a likely ordnance load for an AV-8B Harrier 
(MAWTS-1, 2010).  Assumption 8 is based on the limited 
duration and ordnance carried by CAS aircraft (MAWTS-1, 
2010).  Assumption 9 is based on the researcher‟s own 
experience and the MANPAD threat in the scenario.  
Assumption 10 is based on a discussion with a CAS 
instructor at MAWTS-1 (Major J. F. Foley, personal 
communication, 4/1/2011). 
Assumption 11 reflects that aiming mortar tubes is a 
manual process, and there is no way to quickly revert to a 
previous aim point.  Assumption 12 assumes that the FiST is 
able to find the actual location of a target in a 
negligible amount of time.  Assumption 13 reflects the 
nature of responding to an IDF attack.  It reflects not so 
much the time it takes to hit an IDF team, but rather the 
amount of time the FiST is likely to spend attempting to 
hit such an elusive target.  Assumptions 14 and 15 are 
based on the researcher‟s own experience and the nature of 





1. A CAS aircraft is requested when an appropriate 
target is detected, even if the FiST does not 
have the capacity to act on it at that time. 
2. There is no limit on the number of CAS aircraft 
that can support the CLT. 
3. The FiST does not dynamically retask; once 
committed to a mission, they stay with it  
until complete. 
4. Aircraft cannot be dynamically retasked.  If the 
target it was requested for leaves, the aircraft 
returns to the ARG. 
5. The appearance of a target requires only one 
employment of supporting arms. 
6. If the SACC handles clearance for an event beyond 
the AO, it is not modeled. 
Abstraction one enables the FiST to request a CAS 
aircraft, even though they do not have the capacity to 
necessarily utilize it at the requested time.  This enables 
the FiST to manage its time in a more realistic manner.  
Abstraction two does not take into account the limited 
number of aircraft aboard an ARG.  Since the model is 
focusing on FiST performance and not resource availability, 
the researcher has chosen to make aircraft always 
available.  Abstraction three prevents the mission from 
being dropped in the discrete-event model and never 
resumed.  Abstraction four has the same results  
for aircraft. 
Abstraction five limits the FiST‟s participation in 
any engagement to a single utilization of supporting arms.  
While anactual engagement may last for hours and require 
numerous applications of supporting arms, this abstraction 
eliminates the need to determine damage or lethality of 
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weapons and keeps the model focused on FiST task 
performance.  Abstraction six likewise serves to keep the 
model focused on FiST performance. 
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III.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This chapter describes both the noise and decision 
variables being modeled in this research.  Further, the 
chapter describes the DOE utilized to make the most 
efficient use of the limited resources of time and 
computing power available to the researcher. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An efficient DOE enables simulation-based research to 
explore variables under consideration in a manner that 
makes the best use of limited resources.  In this 
experiment, the limited resource is the time available to 
the researcher to conduct the experiments due to the amount 
of labor involved with each design point.  With an 
efficient design of this experiment, the researcher is able 
to maximize the amount of information he seeks to gather 
from the experiment, while making the best use of  
limited resources. 
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 Two sets of factors were investigated for this 
experiment.  The decision factors are those which decision 
makers can reasonably be expected to control.  Decision 
factors would include equipment decisions and policies 
promulgated by the commander of the CLT or MAGTF.  The 
other factors, known as noise factors, are those that are 
beyond the control of decision makers.  Some factors do not 
fit neatly into either category, but for the purposes of 
this research, each factor is assigned to one category or 
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the other.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize the decision 
and noise factors, respectively. 
Decision Factors 






The work and rest 
cycle of the FiST. 
SACC Policies SAFTE 
Categorical:  
5 levels 
The manner in which 
the SACC has 








The combination of 
fire-support 








The task capacity of 
the FiST. 
Table 1.   Decision factors 
Noise Factors 
Factor Model Range Description 
Terrain Concealment MANA 
Continous: 
0.00 to 1.0 
This measures how much 
concealment the 
terrain offers.  A 
lower number indicates 
less concealment. 
Terrain Going MANA 
Continous: 
0.5 to 0.8 
This measures how 
difficult it is to 
move across the 
terrain.  A higher 
value indicates 
terrain that is easier 
to move across. 
Red Concealment MANA 
Continous: 
0.00 to 0.75 
The ability of Red 
foot-mobile forces 
(IED teams and 
infiltrators) to 
conceal themselves 
from Marine forces. 
Sensor Effectiveness MANA 
Continous: 
0.2 to 1.00 
This number represents 
how well sensors 
function in the 
environment. 
Table 2.   Noise factors 
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1. Decision Factors 
a. FiST Activity Cycle 
This factor represents the choices the CLT can 
make to arrange the FiST‟s activity and rest cycle.  The 
levels are: 
1. The FiST works a 12-hour day from 0800 to 2000.  
They sleep from 2200 to 0600.  The two hours 
before and after their work shift are used to 
take care of other tasks. 
2. The FiST works a “port-and-starboard” schedule.  
Half of the FiST is always manning the radios, 
while the other half is resting or taking care of 
other tasks.  The first shift works from 0800 to 
2000 and the second shift works from 2000 to 
0800.  Turnover times are negligible.  The FiST 
leader is on the first shift, but he must be 
present for all events to give his approval.  The 
artillery FO is present on the second shift.  The 
mortar FO is on the first shift.  The FAC and 
JTAC are on opposite shifts. 
3. The FiST executes a “port-and-starboard” schedule 
as in 2. The FiST leader is only needed when 
there is a task that originates within the AO or 
fires must be cleared by the FiST.  The FiST 
leader would not need to be present to conduct a 
CASEVAC mission or a resupply in the AI.  It is 
assumed that the artillery FO is delegated the 
authority to coordinate nonfire-related tasks in 
the AI. 
4. The FiST executes a “port-and-starboard” schedule 
as in 2.  The FiST leader is only needed when 
there are targets to be engaged in the AO.  Thus, 
for example, he would not need to be present to 
clear fires on a target spotted in the AI nor to 
conduct a CASEVAC or resupply in the AO.  It is 
assumed that the artillery FO is delegated the 
authority to clear fires in the AI and coordinate 
tasks in the AO that do not involve firing. 
5. The FiST executes a “port-and-starboard” schedule 
as in 2.  Whichever section is on duty is 
authorized to perform or approve all tasks 
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without the presence of the FiST leader.  It is 
assumed that the artillery FO has the same 
authority that the FiST leader has during the 
second shift. 
b. SACC Policies 
 This factor represents the amount of authority 
that the SACC has assumed in regard to the clearance of 
fires and how it has defined the responsibility of the 
FiST.  The five SACC policies are: 
1. All approval of fires is done by CLT FiST.  The 
SACC is not involved in clearing any fires and 
the FiST is responsible for all fires and events 
in the AO and AI. 
2. SACC approves all fires in the AI, while FiST 
approves all fires in the AO.  The SACC has full 
responsibility for all events in the AI, while 
the FiST has full responsibility for all events 
in the AO. 
3. The SACC approves all missions in the AI 
requiring CAS, while the FiST approves those that 
do not.  However, the FiST still must coordinate 
all other events in the AI, including CASEVACs 
and resupply missions. 
4. The FiST clears all events within the range of 
the EFSS (12 km with rocket-assisted 
projectiles).  The SACC handles all events beyond 
the range of the EFSS. 
5. In both the AI and AO, SACC approval is necessary 
to engage a target.  The CLT FiST only 
coordinates missions within the AO. 
c. Fire-Support Process 
 This factor represents the different fire-support 
processes for controlling 81mm mortars and the EFSS.  In a 
decentralized process, the firing agency prepares to engage 
the target, while the approving authority reviews the 
mission.  Preparations consist of preparing ammunition and 
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aiming the weapon system at the target.  In a centralized 
process, the firing agency does not begin preparations to 
engage the target until the mission is approved.  A 
decentralized model is usually used for aircraft, due to 
their short on-station time if a JTAC or FAC is controlling 
them.  If there is no JTAC or FAC present, then a 
centralized model is used, with the FiST‟s FAC or JTAC 
handling the details of CAS coordination.  The four  
fire-support processes are: 
1. 81mm mortars and EFSS are always centralized (see 
Figure 13). 
2. Mortars are centralized in the AO, but 
decentralized in the AI (see Figure 14). 
3. 81mm mortars and EFSS are always decentralized 
(see Figure 15). 
4. 81mm mortars are centralized, but EFSS is 
decentralized (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 13.   Fire-Support Process One.  The solid L-shape 
encloses the FiST and the blocks that modify its 
performance, based on its fatigue.  The upper solid oval is 












Figure 14.   Fire-Support Process Two.  The solid 
rectangle encloses the FiST and the blocks that modify its 
performance, based on fatigue.  The dashed square encloses 
the blocks that enable the EFFS to be utilized in a 
decentralized mode beyond the AO.  The upper solid oval is 














Figure 15.   Fire-Support Process Three.  The solid  
L-shape encloses the FiST and the blocks that modify its 
performance, based on its fatigue.  The upper solid oval is 




Figure 16.   The fire-support process for Fire-Support 
Process Four.  The solid rectangle encloses the FiST and 
the blocks that modify its performance, based on its 
fatigue.  The upper solid oval is the CAS process, while 
the lower is the 81mm process.  The dashed oval encloses 
the EFSS process.  In this process, the EFSS operates 
decentralized, while the 81s are centralized. 
d. FiST Task Capacity 
 This factor represents the CLT FiST‟s ability to 
perform multiple simultaneous or near-simultaneous tasks.  
The baseline capacity was determined by soliciting subject 
matter experts (see Chapter IV.A.1).  The baseline reflects 
a FiST with current training and equipped only with maps 
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and radios for communication and coordination.  The 
incrementing of the FiST‟s capacity could reflect a variety 
of methods of increasing the FiST‟s task capacity, but for 
the purposes of this research, it represents an increase in 
task capacity through technological means.  The three task 
capacity levels are: 
1. FiST baseline capacity. 
2. Increment FiST capacity by 1. 
3. Increment FiST capacity by 2. 
2. Noise Factors 
 These factors consist of those conditions that the 
EMAGTF cannot control.  They enable the researcher to see 
how the decision factors perform under a variety of 
conditions in order to find the most robust solution 
(Sanchez, 2000). 
a. Terrain Concealment 
 This factor represents the amount of concealment 
provided by the dominant terrain in the MANA scenario.  A 
higher value indicates a greater amount of concealment, 
while a lower value indicates less concealment.  A high 
value may indicate thick vegetation or a great deal of 
microterrain that enables people to hide.  A low value may 
indicate flatter and more featureless terrain. 
b. Terrain Going 
 This factor represents the difficulty of 
traversing the terrain in the MANA scenario.  It is only 
applied to the dominant terrain in the simulation.  A 
higher value indicates more easily traversable terrain, 
while a lower value represents more challenging terrain.  A 
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high value may indicate a road or other paved and flattened 
surface, while a low value may indicate broken ground with 
numerous gullies. 
c. Red Concealment 
 This factor represents the ability of the Red 
force to hide their actions from the CLT and EMAGTF.  This 
reflects physical concealment that is created by 
camouflaged clothing, taking advantage of natural cover, 
and concealing identifying features such as weapons.  A 
higher value indicates that the Red forces are more 
effective at concealing their presence. 
d. Sensor Effectiveness 
 This factor reflects the effects that weather and 
atmospheric conditions have on the effectiveness of the two 
forces‟ sensors.  The weather or atmospheric effects in 
questions could range from precipitation, haze, or dust to 
anything else that would limit sensor effectiveness for a 
prolonged period. 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (DOE) 
 This research uses an iterative approach to design, 
evaluate, and refine each step of the experiment.  For each 
phase, reviews were conducted of the input and the output.  
If the output was determined to have diverged significantly 
from reality, the model and the input data were revisited 
and revised as necessary to conform to the goals of  
the experiment. 
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1. Overall Design 
 Traditionally, experiments involving categorical 
decision factors utilize a full-factorial DOE.  This 
obviously results in very large design matrices.  In the 
case of this research‟s decision variables, this would have 
resulted in 300 design points representing every input 
combination.  When noise factors are added in, the full DOE 
would reach 5,100 design points.  In some environments this 
would not be considered onerous, given sufficient time and 
computing resources.  However, due to the time limitations 
of this research and because three different models are 
being incorporated, the researcher decided that such an 
approach was intractable. 
Helcio Veiera developed a technique called the Nearly-
Balanced Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NBNOLH) that 
allows more efficient designs when using categorical 
decision variables.  This technique makes use of mixed-
integer programming to create more efficient orthogonal 
designs (Vieira, Sanchez, Kienitz, & Beldarrain, 2011).   
When Veiera‟s technique is applied to the decision factors, 
the result is a design matrix with only 40 design points.  
This DOE has a maximum correlation of 0.0627.  
Interestingly, the NBNOLH repeats design point 27 as design 
point 35.  This is necessary in order to keep the 
correlation coefficient within tolerance (H. Veiera, 
personal communication, 4/26/2011). 
In order to create a more robust design, the 
researcher utilizes an Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (OLH) to 
create a design matrix for the noise factors (Cioppa & 
Lucas, 2007).  This process creates a design matrix with 17 
design points.  The OLH should create a perfectly 
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orthogonal design matrix, but in this case, the 
correlations were not quite as expected due to rounding 
(see Figure 17).  This is because the design matrix is only 
carried to two places in the OLH spreadsheet, because the 
four noise factors can only be input with two-digit 
precision in MANA.  Despite this, the resultant 
correlations are still quite small, indicating that the OLH 
very closely approximates orthogonality. 
 
Figure 17.   The correlation matrix and scatterplot of 
the Noise Factor DOE.  The scatterplot shows all of the 
pairwise input combinations of noise factors. 
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This noise factor design matrix is then crossed with 
the NBNOLH design matrix to create the final design matrix 
(Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, & Cioppa, 2005).  The result is 
a design matrix with 680 design points.  The highest 
correlation, between the FiST Capacity and the SACC Policy, 
is below 0.05, bringing the design quite close to being 
completely orthogonal (see Figure 18).  The crossing of the 
two matrices allows the researcher to examine each design 
point from the NBNOLH over a range of conditions.  This, in 
turn, enables the researcher to make policy recommendations 
that are valid over a wide range of conditions (Kleijnen et 
al., 2005). 
 
Figure 18.   The correlation matrix and scatterplot of 
the final DOE. 
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2. Full Factorial for Fatigue 
 While the overall design matrix makes use of the 
latest advances in the field of DOE, the design for the 
fatigue experiment uses perhaps the oldest DOE technique.  
Based on the assumptions for the SAFTE model (see Chapter 
II.C.3), the FiST Activity Cycle and SACC Policy factors 
are the only two decision factors that affect the fatigue 
analysis conducted with the SAFTE model.  Additionally, an 
inspection of the final experiment‟s DOE reveals that the 
two factors are combined in a full factorial, with several 
repetitions.  In order to reduce the workload, the 
researcher uses a full-factorial design matrix.  The 
resulting matrix, when crossed with the noise factors, 
yields a design matrix with 425 design points.  Since this 
reflects a significant reduction in work from the 680 
design points in the overall DOE, and still provides all of 
the information that the researcher needs, this option is 
used for the fatigue experiment.  Since this DOE is the 
result of a cross between an OLH and a full factorial, it 
should be completely orthogonal.  However, when the 
correlation matrix is inspected, it is obvious that this is 
not quite so (see Figure 19).  As with the final DOE, this 
is because of the rounding done in the OLH; however, the 
highest correlation is only 0.0079, which is still nearly 
orthogonal.  Thus, there should be no adverse 
multicollinearity effects (Devore, 2008). 
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Figure 19.   The correlation matrix and scatterplot of 




D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENTS 
 Each repetition of the MANA scenario takes 
approximately an hour to run on a modern desktop processor, 
during which it develops two months‟ worth of performance 
data.  Since this is a significant use of the SEED Center‟s 
resources, the researcher decided to limit the model to 30 
replications at each design point.  Only noise factors are 
varied in MANA, so only the OLH DOE is run through that 
model.  This results in 510 individual MANA repetitions, 
which takes up to a day to complete on the SEED Center‟s 
computing cluster.  Steve Upton, who works for the SEED 
Center, created a postprocessor that then organizes the 
data into a useable format for analysis by the researcher.  
This postprocessor likewise can take about a day to finish 
running.  Thus, every run of the MANA simulation takes at 
least two days to generate useful data. 
At this point, the researcher utilizes a data 
organizing and reconciling script in R that organizes the 
data for ease of analysis and follow-on computations.  The 
output of the seventeen design points of the MANA 
experiment is evaluated and analyzed for each SACC Policy, 
as this factor is the one that most directly affects the 
arrival processes.  If an event occurred in a location that 
the FiST was not responsible for, it is ignored.  This, in 
turn, allowed the researcher to organize the data in a 
format that would be immediately useful for the discrete-
event model.  The data is then studied by the researcher to 
ensure that enough events are occurring in the AO to 
generate a statistically useful amount of events in the 
discrete-event model.  The researcher then alters the noise 
factors and obtains a new Latin Hypercube before running 
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the MANA simulation again.  Once the simulation provided 
useful and reliable results, the data were analyzed before 
use in the fatigue model. 
 A challenge that appears frequently throughout this 
research is the need for manual transfers, or “air gaps,” 
between models (see Figure 20), output, and analysis.  
These gaps are where the workload increased significantly, 
as the researcher is unable to find a way to automate the 
interface between models and some of the data analysis 
tools.  The first manual transfer occurs after the MANA 
model is run and the data are prepared for analysis.  JMP 
offers the most accessible tool for fitting the arrival of 
events to a distribution for use in the fatigue and 
discrete-event models.  However, while JMP enables a 
limited amount of scripting, the analysis being done does 
not readily lend itself to this, and so it is done by hand.  
The next manual transfer appears where the sleep schedules 
are created.  Once the arrival processes are analyzed, R is 
used to create sleep schedules for use in the SAFTE model 
through the FAST interface.  R is very good at creating the 
necessary data strings, but it does not format the output 
file in such a way that it can be read in by FAST.  Thus, 
the researcher has to save the file in a different format 
and then manually alter each file.  While the alterations 
are trivial, and take less than a minute, there are 425 
files.  Fortunately, FAST has the ability to receive files 
in a very limited batch mode, and the output data is 
readable by R without further formatting.  From analysis of 
this data, the researcher can make recommendations on 
policies that maximize cognitive effectiveness.  
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Additionally, the fatigue model‟s output is used to create 
effectiveness data in the discrete-event model. 
 
Figure 20.   Experimental flow with the manual transfers 
noted.  These are the greatest impediment to the research 
as they consume large amounts of time, and after passing 
them, going back becomes problematic at best. 
 The last model to be created and run is the  
discrete-event model.  Before it can be run, however, the 
researcher gathers data from the supporting training 
commands in the form of performance data and Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) inputs.  The data and insight from the SMEs 
are focused on how quickly the FiST, SACC, and firing 
agencies can perform the tasks necessary to engage targets 
under the conditions presented in the model, and how many 
tasks the FiST can complete simultaneously. 
 The discrete-event model is constructed in ExtendSim7, 
at the request of MCWL.  One of the challenges with 
utilizing ExtendSim7 at NPS is that it is not located on a 
cluster, but only on individual workstations.  Furthermore, 
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the workstations tended to fail after a few hundred runs of 
the model.  The researcher thus limits each design point to 
only 100 runs in order to ensure coverage of the final DOE.  
Running the discrete-event model proved to be an extremely 
labor-intensive task, and took approximately two weeks to 
complete due to the size of the matrix and the limitations 
of ExtendSim7 in the NPS environment.  However, upon 
completion, the researcher is able to quickly organize the 
output data with an R-script and commence analysis. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter summarizes how the data is analyzed,and 
interpreted by the researcher. 
A. GATHERED DATA 
 The researcher attempted to gather a significant 
amount of data from the Training and Tactical Exercise 
Control Group (TTECG), Expeditionary Warfare Training Group 
Pacific (EWTG-PAC), Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron 
One (MAWTS-1), and the mortar course at 1
st
 Marine Division 
Schools.  The data sought were a mixture of training 
performance data and SME inputs.  The list of questions 
that were asked of the SMEs is located in the Appendix:  
SME Questions.  All of the data were gathered under the 
auspices of the NPS Institutional Review Board.  
Regrettably, only MAWTS-1 responded and provided data and 
SME insight. 
1. Data 
 Dr. Fredlake, an analyst assigned to MAWTS-1, provided 
the researcher with analysis that he produced for MAWTS-1 
on the topic of how long it took for aircraft to deliver 
ordnance once they had received the appropriate 9-line 
brief3 from a FAC or JTAC.  Dr Fredlake‟s research covers 
both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, employing a variety 
of ordnance.  However, the researcher is only focusing on 
the time it takes for fixed-wing aircraft to deliver bombs; 
based on model assumptions and the scenario (see  
                     
3 A 9-line brief is the mission information that a JTAC passes to a 
CAS aircraft in order to initiate a mission. 
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Chapter II).  Dr. Fredlake asserts that there is no 
statistical difference between fixed-wing aircraft 
delivering guided or unguided ordnance, so the researcher 
is using the aggregated data for both types of weapons 
(Fredlake, 2010).  The result is an approximately normal 
distribution, with a mean of 8.3 minutes and a standard 
deviation of 3.9 minutes.  However, Dr. Fredlake notes that 
the values must be positive, so the normal distribution is 
only an approximation (Dr. C. Fredlake, personal 
communication, 3/31/2011).  According to Dr. Fredlake‟s 
research, the shortest time from receipt of a 9-line brief 
to ordnance delivery is one minute.  For the purpose of the 
model, the time to deliver ordnance is determined from a 
truncated normal distribution, with the parameters given 
above, and a lower limit of one minute. 
2. Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
 Major James Foley, USMC, an instructor in MAWTS-1‟s 
Air Officer Department, provides significant insights into 
the capacity of a FAC or JTAC operating alone or in a FiST.  
He states that FACs and JTACs can manage three aircraft or 
sections, but can only employ two of them while the third 
holds.  Additionally, he asserts that attacks against 
multiple targets or using multiple aircraft sections are 
almost always sequential.  He states that it can take from 
2 minutes to more than 10 minutes for a FAC or JTAC to 
develop his plan and 9-line brief for arriving aircraft 
while working with a FiST.  Additionally, Major Foley 
states that a FAC or JTAC may take from 5 minutes to over 
15 minutes to pass the 9-line brief to an arriving 
aircraft.  He also states that the presence of unsuppressed 
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MANPADs in the vicinity of a target for fixed-wing CAS 
would not have a significant effect on the time to 
prosecute the target, as the fixed-wing aircraft could 
either remain above the MANPAD threat throughout the 
engagement or only expose itself briefly during the final 
attack phase (Major J. F. Foley, personal communication, 
4/1/2011). 
Based on Major Foley‟s insight, for purposes of this 
model, an aircraft or section in holding is considered to 
still be in the queue, so it does not affect the FiST‟s 
capacity.  Furthermore, all aircraft employment is handled 
sequentially.  Finally, employing an aircraft utilizes one 
unit of task capacity for the FiST.  If another aircraft is 
being utilized, but not holding, such as a UAS, another 
unit of capacity is used.  Finally, employing mortars in 
conjunction with the aircraft uses another unit of task 
capacity.  Thus, in a scenario where a target has to be 
engaged with aircraft and mortars and a UAS is present, 
three units of task capacity are needed to execute the 
mission.  The time ranges that Major Foley provided are 
used in the model as uniform distributions with ranges 
[2,10] and [5,15] for developing a CAS mission and passing 
the 9-line to an aircraft, respectively. 
B. FARMED DATA 
 Data farming permits the researcher to explore a 
problem by varying factors of a model that may provide 
insights.  The researcher then utilizes the results to 
further explore particular areas of the model to gain 
better insight into the model.  In this research, the 
process was only conducted once, but further research and 
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exploration of the results could result in several “growing 
seasons” of data being developed (Horne, 2001). 
1. MANA Output Data 
 Steve Upton‟s postprocessor takes the data from 
numerous MANA output files and organizes them in a manner 
convenient for analysis.  This postprocessor returned three 
files in comma separated variable format: 
1. allContacts:  This file recorded the time, 
location, duration, and name of each enemy 
detection. 
2. allShotEvents:  This file recorded the time, 
location, and name of each IED event, whether it 
detonated or not.  Additionally, it recorded all 
instances and locations of Red force Indirect 
Fire (IDF). 
3. allUAVContacts:  This file recorded the time, 
location, duration, and name of each enemy 
detection made by a UAS. 
The researcher then runs his own R script to analyze 
the data.  The researcher first eliminates any encounters 
with Red forces that lasted five or fewer minutes from 
allContacts.  These encounters are a MANA artifact, as they 
represent CLT forces gaining and then losing contact 
repeatedly over short time periods with the same enemy 
unit.  By removing these contacts, the number of enemy 
contacts is decreased by as much as 50%.  The researcher 
chose a threshold of five minutes as, in his experience, it 
would be very difficult for an observing unit to identify, 
locate, and then coordinate any sort of supporting arms 
engagement in that period.  This same culling was used on 
allUAVContacts. 
The researcher next reconciles the CW-IED team events 
in allContacts and allShotEvents.  The goal, in this case, 
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is to avoid duplicate counting of encounters.  The file 
allContacts included CW-IED teams that were encountered 
while moving, but also after they had attempted to detonate 
an IED.  The file allShotEvents only included those CW-IED 
contacts that had attempted or succeeded in detonating an 
IED.  The researcher reconciled the data by removing all of 
the ambushes instigated by CW-IED teams from allContacts.   
a. Arrival Rates 
 The first analytical task the researcher 
undertakes with this data is to determine the arrival 
process for specific events.  The researcher first 
segregates the data by event, and then calculates 
interarrival times between the same types of events.  The 
Decision Factor that has the most bearing on the arrival 
rate of events is the SACC Policy, as the researcher is 
only interested in events the FiST has to respond to.  
Thus, the researcher analyzes each of the MANA runs based 
on the OLH over the five different SACC policies.  This 
analysis, based on SACC Policy, allows the construction of 
arrival distributions specific to the SACC Policy and 
design point of the Noise OLH. 
 The specific events that are being analyzed are: 
1. CW-IED teams detonating an IED:  This indicates 
an ambush concurrent with a CASEVAC. 
2. CW-IED teams failing to detonate an IED:  This 
indicates an ambush without a concurrent CASEVAC. 
3. CW-IED teams:  This indicates the detection of a 
moving CW-IED team. 
4. IDF teams:  This indicates the detection of an 
IDF team.  It does not mean that IDF has  
been received. 
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5. Infiltrators:  This indicates the detection of 
Red Infiltrators. 
6. Technicals:  This indicates the detection of Red 
Technical Vehicles. 
7. VIED:  This indicates a VIED detonating, 
resulting in a CASEVAC. 
8. VIED teams:  This indicates the detection of 
moving VIED emplacers. 
9. IDF fire on the base:  This indicates Red IDF 
teams firing on the CLT base. 
The researcher then fits distributions using 
Corrected Akaike‟s Information Criterion to each of the 
arrival data sets (SAS Institute Inc., 2010).  Often, the 
distribution that best fit the data was of a type not 
supported in ExtendSim7.  For arrivals, the Weibull, 
Normal, and Exponential distributions work best in 
ExtendSim7, while the Lognormal and Logistic did not, due 
to how the arrival process is structured in ExtendSim7.  
Thus, the researcher finds the best-fitting distribution 
that worked in ExtendSim7.  The median value of each 
distribution enables the researcher to create the expected 
arrival times for the fatigue model, and also serves as a 
gauge of the frequency of events.  Additionally, the median 
was less likely to be influenced by extreme values.  A look 
at the median values indicates that the arrival rates for 
CW-IED teams, Infiltrators, and VIED teams are very high.  
In fact, they occur at such a frequency that they often 
overlapped.  A test run of the fatigue model with these 
events resulted in virtually no sleep for the FiST under 
every SACC Policy and Activity Cycle.  Based on the 
researcher‟s own experience, and the stated goal that this 
model is to simulate low to mid-intensity combat, the 
researcher removed this data from consideration.  The 
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researcher believes that further culling, based on event 
duration, would be arbitrary, and would also bias the 
results of the discrete-event model phase of this research.  
The remaining event arrivals provide a reasonable 
approximation to mid-intensity combat.  All further 
analysis ignored the CW-IED teams, Infiltrators, and  
VIED teams. 
b. Arrival Locations 
 The researcher next determines the probability 
that given an event occurs, which zone it occurs in (see 
Figure 7).  This was done for each combination of SACC 
Policy and design point in the Noise OLH.  This is done for 
all of the events listed above, except for IDF fire on the 
CLT base, which always occurs in Zone 1. 
c. Contact Durations 
The researcher fits the contact duration data to 
a distribution, based on the noise with Corrected Akaike‟s 
Information Criterion (SAS Institute Inc., 2010).  In every 
case, the researcher aggregates the raw data in Zones IIa 
and IIb because the discrete-event model treats both zones 
as a single zone.  Further, there is often a paucity of 
data points for contact durations in some zones.  In these 
cases, the data is aggregated with the nearest zone, and 
the zones share the same distribution.  As with the 
analysis of arrival data, the best-fitting duration 
distirbution was not always in a form compatible with 




best-fitting distribution that worked easily with 
ExtendSim7.  LogNormal, Exponential, and Weibull 
distributions best met this criteria. 
d. Dependant Events 
 The researcher analyzes how often contact with 
the Red forces involved a UAS or possible indirect fire 
from an enemy IDF team.  This information adds realism to 
the discrete-event model by adding additional stressors to 
the FiST. 
The researcher totals the number of Red contacts 
in the zone and divides by the number of UAS contacts in 
the zone to determine the empirical probability of a UAS 
being involved in an encounter.  Due to the difficulties in 
reconciling some of the data, the probabilities sometimes 
exceed 1.0.  This occurs because UASs often “double-up” on 
contacts, or hand off contacts to each other.  In these 
cases, the probability is simply set to 1.0.  In every 
area, except for Zones 2 and 4, there is a very high 
probability of a UAS being present when a target is 
detected or tracking a target detected by other means.  
Zones 2 and 4 are significantly less likely to see a 
contact with a Red unit involve a UAS.  This is likely due 
to the very small size of their area, and because they 
provide a great deal of concealment to the Red forces, 
since they are urban areas. 
The researcher sums the number of IDF attacks on 
CLT units and recon teams in each zone for each OLH design 
point, and then divides by the sum of CLT and recon team 
encounters in that zone.  The result is the probability 
that a Marine unit would receive IDF after encountering a 
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Red unit.  The frequencies are so low (see Table 3) that 
the researcher has decided to ignore this data and not to 
incorporate it into the discrete-event model as originally 
planned.  The researcher believes the inclusion of this 
would add a significant amount of complication to the 
discrete-event model and yield little benefit. 
DP Zone1 Zone2 Zone3 Zone4 Zone5 Zone6 
1 0.000593 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.000396 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0.000196 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0.004608 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0.002392 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0.000238 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0.015152 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0.002703 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3.   Probability of a CLT unit receiving IDF fire 
while in contact with a Red unit.  The probability of this 
is extremely low across the spectrum of design points  
in MANA. 
2. SAFTE Output Data 
 The MOEs from SAFTE are the average cognitive 
effectiveness and the minimum cognitive effectiveness of 
the FiST.  The researcher calculates these for the first 15 
days, the first 30 days, and the whole 60 days.  For FiST 
Activity Policy 1, this requires entering the activity 
schedule into SAFTE and reporting the results.  FiST 
Activities 2 through 4 require some reconciliation.  A 
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simple schedule is calculated for the night shift without 
any interruptions.  This schedule is then compared to the 
dayshift schedule of the FiST leader with interruptions.  
During the day shift, the FiST leader‟s effectiveness is 
used.  During the night shift, the FiST leader‟s 
effectiveness is compared with the night shift‟s, and the 
lowest effectiveness is used.  FiST Activity 5 is the 
combination of two rest plans, for the opposite shifts of 
the FiST.  The resulting output is then collapsed across 
the noise factors.  Note that the standard deviation of 
FiST Activity 5 is zero, as the nature of the policy 
essentially removed the effect of the noise factors since 
the two shifts are only functioning at their assigned 
times. 
a. Mean Cognitive Effectiveness 
 The researcher evaluates the mean cognitive 
effectiveness by using expected loss.  This method enables 
the researcher to account for the mean value, as well as 
variation, in order to find the course of action that 
results in the most robust solution that minimizes the loss 
of effectiveness.  This function is represented by: 
2 2( )E L
.
 
 The researcher set  to 100, which represents the 
goal of 100% cognitive effectiveness.  μ is the mean 
cognitive effectiveness for the time period under 
consideration.  σ is the standard deviation of the mean 
cognitive effectiveness. 
 The researcher chooses to use a partition tree to 
display the results of the expected loss analysis.  This 
format is easily understood by readers both with and 
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without a technical background.  The algorithm seeks to 
group the effective loss into two groups of low 
variability.  The algorithm then determines which decision 
factor to split into branches in order to attain this 
outcome (Hand, Mannila, & Smyth, 2001).  The process is 
repeated on each branch of the tree.  This results in an 
easy to understand graphical display of results. 
 The result of this analysis shows that the 
minimum effective loss occurs when FiST Activity Policy 5 
was selected for all three time.  However, this may not 
always be an option, depending on command policies and the 
level of confidence the FiST leader has in the other 
members of his team.  In this case, the duration of the 
team‟s employment drives the selection of the secondary 
policy (see Figures 21-23).  If the FiST will be employed 
for fifteen days or less, the FiST leader should seek to 
delegate authority for all fires outside of the AO and 
nonfire events in the AO to the night shift.  Failing this, 
the FiST leader should seek to limit the scope of the CLT 
FiST‟s responsibility.  For longer deployments, the FiST 
leader should seek to reduce the scope of the FiST‟s 
responsibility as the secondary policy.  If the FiST leader 
is unable to do that, then he should seek to delegate 
authority to the night shift for fires outside of the AO 
and nonfiring events in the AO. 
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Figure 21.   Partition tree for minimum effective loss of 
cognitive effectiveness for 15-day FiST employment.  As can 
be seen, the best policy in this case is to utilize FiST 
Activity Policy 5.  Failing that, FiST Activity Policy 4 is 
the next best option. 
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Figure 22.   Partition tree for minimum effective loss of 
cognitive effectiveness for 30-day FiST employment.  As can 
be seen, the best policy in this case is to utilize FiST 
Activity Policy 5.  Failing that, SACC Policies 5 or 2 are 
the next best option. 
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Figure 23.   Partition tree for minimum effective loss of 
cognitive effectiveness for 60-day FiST emplotment.  In 
this case is to utilize FiST Activity Policy 5.  Failing 
that, SACC Policy 4 is the next best option. 
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b. Worst Case Cognitive Effectiveness 
 The minimum cognitive effectiveness is also 
included in the data.  This data informs decision makers 
about the possible shortcoming of a policy combination.  
FiST Activity Policy 5 has the highest minimum 
effectiveness, and reaches this point within the first 
fifteen days.  All of the other policy combinations have 
significantly lower minimum cognitive effectiveness within 
the first fifteen days, and continue to decline at least 
into the first 30 days, and, in some cases, over the entire 
60-day period.  This supports the use of FiST Activity 
Policy 5 as the best overall choice for an activity policy. 
3. Discrete-Event Model Output Data 
 The MOE for the discrete-event model is FiST task 
performance.  This is defined as the ratio of the number of 
fire-support tasks successfully completed to the number of 
fire-support tasks attempted.  This excludes any tasks that 
were still waiting to start in the queue, as well as all 
CASEVAC and resupply missions.   
a. Arrival Frequency 
The researcher analyzes the data output from 
ExtendSim7 to ensure that the simulation reflects a low to 
mid-intensity combat scenario. 
The researcher determines the average arrival 
rate of fire-support events for each design point and plots 
a histogram (see Figure 24).  The arrival process has both 
a mean and a median of approximately two events per day, 
with the lowest frequency being about one event every two  
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days, and the highest almost five events per day.  This 
appears to capture the range of low- to mid-intensity  
combat operations. 
 
Figure 24.   Arrival Frequencies of Fire-Support Events.  
The median and mean have approximately two events arriving 
per day, and only at the 90
th
 percentile does this increase 
to three events.  This appears to capture the range of 
combat from low- to mid-intensity. 
b. Fist Endurance 
 Another question of particular concern to MCWL is 
how long a FiST, as currently organized, can function with 
a CLT.  In order to answer this and subsequent questions, 
the researcher collapses the data across the noise factors.  
The researcher looks at the worst performance of each 
policy combination over the three time intervals.  In 
conjunction with MCWL, the researcher set 0.8 as the 
threshold for failure.  The worst mean performance for each 
combination of decision factors is utilized to compare 
performance.  The combination that most closely resembles a 
current FiST is the one with FiST Activity Policy 1, SACC 
Policy 5, Fire Support Policy 2, and FiST Capacity 2.  This 
combination‟s worst performance was consistently under 80% 
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in all three time intervals (0.79, 0.78, and 0.78 for 15, 
30, and 60 days, respectively).  However, it was not the 
worst combination.  The worst performer was a design point 
with FiST Activity Policy 5, SACC Policy 5, Fire Support 
Policy 3, and FiST Capacity 1.  This FiST reflects several 
changes made to the FiST structure, most notably the 
delegation of full authority to the second shift, which 
maximizes the cognitive effectiveness of the FiST.  Despite 
this, this combination resulted in sustained performance of 
just over 0.7 for the entire experiment. 
c. Effectiveness 
 The researcher initially looks at FiST 
performance by finding the mean and minimum performance for 
each combination of design factors for the entire 60-day 
period.  A casual examination reveals that the ten most 
effective combinations utilize either SACC Policy 3 or 4, 
while including the whole range of the other factors.  
Similarly, the researcher found that of the ten lowest-
performing design points, seven of them utilized SACC 
Policy 5, and the other three utilized SACC Policy 1.  In 
fact, the six lowest-performing design points utilized only 
SACC Policy 5.  As with the high performers, the other 
decision factors displayed the full range of options among 
the weakest performers.  This inspection of the data 
suggests that SACC Policy 5 reduces performance 
significantly, while SACC Policies 3 and 4 tend to  
enhance it. 
 The researcher also examined the worst 
performance of each of the combinations of decision 
factors.  Those ten highest combinations with the best 
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minimum performance were more varied than the ten highest 
mean performances, though they notably did not include SACC 
Policy 5.  The ten lowest minimum performance combinations, 
however, strongly resembled the ten lowest mean performance 
events.  Six of them utilized SACC Policy 5, while the 
remaining four were split between SACC Policies 1 and 4.  
This simple inspection of the data again suggests that SACC 
Policy 5 diminishes performance. 
 In order to gain more insight into the problem, 
the researcher compares FiST effectiveness by using 
expected loss.  This method enables the researcher to 
account for the mean value, as well as variation, in order 
to find the course of action that results in the most 
robust solution that minimizes the loss of effectiveness.  
This function is represented by: 
2 2( )E L
.
 
 The researcher set  to 1.0, which represents the 
goal of servicing 100% of the targets.  μ is the mean FiST 
performance for the time period under consideration.  σ is 
the standard deviation of the FiST performance with the 
same decision factors.  The partition trees show the 
results of this analysis (see Figures 25, 26, and 27 for 
fifteen days, 30 days, and 60 days of FiST employment, 
respectively).  In all three of these trees, the first 
split removes SACC Policy 5 in order to improve 
performance.   In the 15- and 30-day trees, the first split 
also removes SACC Policy 1 as well, while the second split 
for the 60-day employment removes SACC Policy 1.  Following 
the splits based on SACC Policies 1 and 5, the next split 
is based on the fire-support process, and all subsequent 
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splits are based on further refinement of the SACC Policy 
choice.  However, the variance and expected loss have the 
most significant decreases in the initial SACC Policy 
splits.  The researcher concludes from this that the FiST 
should have the authority to clear their own fires, in 
contrast to SACC Policy 5.  Further, the geographic scope 
of the FiST‟s responsibility should be reduced from the 
entire AO and AI (SACC Policy 1).  The remaining three SACC 
Policies all authorize the FiST to clear its own fires and 
restrict its responsibility to either the AO or the AO and 
part of the AI.  FiST Activity Policy and FiST Task 
Capacity are both ubiquitous by their absence in all three 
of these trees.  The researcher believes that the 
limitations of the fatigue research (see Chapter II.B.7) 
may account for the apparent lack of importance placed on 









Figure 25.   The partition tree for FiST effectiveness 
over a period of 60 days.  As can be seen, the largest 












Figure 26.   Thirty-day effectiveness.  Here too, the 
largest decrease in expected loss is found by using SACC 
Policies 2, 3, or 4. 
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Figure 27.   Fifteen-day effectiveness.  Here too, the 
largest decrease in expected loss is found by using SACC 
Policies 2, 3, or 4. 
 In order to gain further insight into these 
models, and some understanding of the role of FiST Activity 
Policy and Task Capacity, the researcher constructs a 
multiple regression model using stepwise regression on a 
60-day employment.  The researcher chooses to consider all 
first order effects and interactions (see Figure 28).  The 
first two terms confirm the essential correctness of the 
partition trees‟ initial splits.  FiST Activity Policy 
appears in an interaction with the SACC Policy as the third 
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most important factor, but the SACC Policy includes SACC 
Policy 1, which is removed in the first or second split of 
the partition tree.   This would account for the absence of 
the FiST Activity policy in the partition tree.  FiST Task 
Capacity appears as only the ninth most important factor. 
 
Figure 28.   The multiple regression model for 60-day 
FiST effectiveness.  Note the high level of importance 
given to the removal of SACC Policies 1 and 5.  FiST 
Activity appears in combination as the third most important 
factor, and on its own as the seventh most important.  The 
FiST‟s task capacity only appears as the ninth most 
important factor. 
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 The regression model for 30-day FiST employment 
is quite similar.  However, the regression model for 
fifteen-day employment (see Figure 29) shows that FiST Task 
Capacity is a close second to SACC Policy in importance, 
and yet it is not considered on the partition tree (see 
Figure 27).  The researcher disaggregates FiST performance 
into performance of missions requiring close air support, 
possibly supported by mortars, and missions utilizing only 
mortars in order to further explore this. 
 
Figure 29.   While the utilization of SACC Policies 2, 3, 
or 4 remains the most important factor, increased FiST 
capacity is a very close second, even though it does not 
show up on the partition tree. 
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The partition tree for fifteen-day employment of 
CAS does not show particularly unexpected results (see 
Figure 30), though both Task Capacity and Activity Policy 
appear in the lower branches.  Mortar missions (see Figure 
31), however, show significantly different results.  In 
this case, FiST capacity is the most important effect on 
minimizing effective loss, while SACC policies are 
distinctly secondary.  The researcher believes that this is 
because the SACC policies do not have as significant an 
impact on mortar employment as they do on aircraft.  The 
81mm mortars do not see any reduction in the number of 
targets based on any SACC policies, while the EFSS only 
sees the last three km of its twelve km range ring reduced 
by SACC Policies 1, 2, and 5.  By comparison, those same 
policies remove large amounts of the battle space from 
consideration by CAS aircraft, at least as far as the FiST 
is concerned.  A multiple regression performed under the 
same conditions as those for overall performance confirms 
the validity of the mortar effectiveness partition tree 
(see Figure 32).  A perusal of the disaggregated 
performance for both the 30-day and 60-day CAS and mortar 








Figure 30.   Expected loss for CAS mission performance 
over 15 days.  As expected, SACC Policies are the most 
important factors in minimizing expected loss.  However, 











Figure 31.   Expected loss for mortar mission performance 
over 15 days.  Maximizing FiST capacity appears to be the 
most effective means of reducing effective loss, followed 
by adjusting the SACC Policy. 
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Figure 32.   A multiple regression of 15-day mortar 
effectiveness expected loss.  Note the importance of the 
FiST‟s capacity. 
d. Task Saturation 
 Task saturation is a particular concern for MCWL, 
as the SACC will not necessarily be able to take the load 
off of an overwhelmed FiST.  In this model, task saturation 
is defined to occur whenever a task is delayed in the queue 
because the FiST is unable to service it.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the FiST has no capacity left, but it 
does not have enough capacity left to deal with the task in 
question.  For every event that waits in the queue, the 
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total count of task saturation is incremented by one for 
that model run.  This count is then divided by the total 
number of events that pass through the model to create the 
saturation ratio: 
Total Events Delayed in Queue




 This ratio is compared to the ratio of fire 
support events that renege before service to all fire 
support events that pass through the system.  The 
researcher used only the events that renege before service, 
as their reneging is wholly attributable to task 
saturation.  An event that reneged after service and was 
delayed in the queue may have reneged due to task 
saturation itself, or due to a combination of task 
saturation and other causes, and the model does not support 
analysis of this.  The failure due to task saturation ratio 
is then tested for correlation with the saturation ratio 
for every design point (see Figure 31).  The distribution 
of p-values indicates that all but a few of these tests 
established dependence between the two ratios with an α of 
0.05.  The distribution or correlations further shows that 
the correlation is overwhelmingly positive. 
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Figure 33.   The correlation test of the task saturation 
ratios and the failure without service ratios.  As can be 
seen, the p-value distribution (top) establishes that in 
over 75% of cases there is linear dependence, and the 
correlation distribution (bottom) establishes that this 
correlation is positive. 
 However, the existence of correlation does not 
necessarily imply significance to the effects of task 
saturation.  The distribution of the failure ratio (see 
Figure 32) shows that the proportion of events at each 
design point that fail solely to saturation is low.  While 
the maximum failure rate is just shy of 7%, the 
overwhelming majority of failure rates are below 3%.  This 
implies that failures due to task saturation are not 
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significant.  Using the expected loss technique, with  
 = 0, the most effective means to reduce failed missions 
due solely to task saturation is to significantly increase 
the task capacity of the FiST (see Figure 35).  However, 
when overall FiST performance is considered, the task 
capacity of the FiST was not one of the more significant 
factors (see Figure 28) except in the mortar employment 
analysis. 
 
Figure 34.   The rate at which events renege before the 













Figure 35.   Partition tree to minimize effective loss 
due to task saturation. 
 101 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The researcher‟s analysis of the model results 
provides interesting insight into the research questions 
posited in Chapter I.  These insights remain contingent on 
the scenario and assumptions from Chapter II. 
1. How Long Can the Current FiST Sustain ECO? 
 The fatigue and final models both suggest that a FiST 
operating as currently constituted would reach failure 
within the first fifteen days of employment.  The data from 
the former model showed the current organization schema of 
the FiST resulting in the worst possible cognitive task 
effectiveness in each employment length across all of the 
noise points.  In this model, the culprit is the FiST‟s 
restrictive rest policy, coupled with the scope of its 
responsibility.  The discrete-event model, while not 
labeling the current configuration as the worst performer, 
clearly showed it to be lacking compared with most other 
policy combinations.  In this model, the analysis showed 
that failure was primarily due to the necessity of getting 
SACC approval for each mission. 
 The fatigue model prevented the FiST from adapting its 
sleep schedule to events.  Essentially, if their sleep is 
interrupted, they were unable to take a subsequent nap to 
try to restore it.  While this suggests a bias in favor of 
the day and night shift schedules, none of the other FiST 
activity policies allow flexible sleeping patterns either. 
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2. How Often Will the FiST Fail to Execute Tasks Due 
to Task Saturation? 
 The analysis demonstrates that task saturation is a 
very infrequent event.  While it correlates to events 
reneging before they are serviced, it is questionable if, 
in a mid-intensity environment, it warrants further study.  
While the model abstracted each engagement to require only 
one supporting arms engagement, it could be argued that a 
real engagement, even against a small unit, could see 
numerous supporting arms assets flood the battlefield and 
possibly overwhelm the FiST.  However, this would be a case 
of the FiST succumbing to its own friction instead of the 
pace of events. 
3. What Affects Do Various SACC and Fire Support 
Policies Have on Performance? 
 The most important policy that the SACC can implement 
to improve FiST performance is to delegate weapons‟ 
clearance authority to the FiST.  Additionally, the size 
and scope of the FiST‟s responsibility needs to be properly 
scaled to afford them the best ability to quickly  
engage targets. 
4. Does Improving C2 Equipment Increase the FiST’s 
Performance? 
 An increase in FiST task capacity, which functions as 
a proxy for improved C2 equipment, does not have a 
significant positive effect on FiST performance.  The 
researcher believes this is because task saturation is not 
a significant cause of mission failure. 
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5. What FiST SOPs Have a Positive Effect on 
Performance? 
 While FiST SOPs significantly affect the units‟ 
cognitive effectiveness, they are not a significant factor 
in assessing overall FiST performance with the discrete-
event model.  This implies that in low- to mid-intensity 
combat, the FiST can get enough sleep to function 
effectively, and that the FiST‟s cognitive effectiveness, 
as presented in this model, was not as important as the 
scope of responsibility assigned and the authority 
delegated to them.  However, cognitive effectiveness was 
abstracted in this model as a time penalty.  No attempt was 
made to measure the effect of cognitive effectiveness on 
accurately completing a task.  In addition, the researcher 
believes that the limits noted with the fatigue model (see 
Chapter II.B.7) may have reduced the apparent importance of 
the FiST‟s work and rest plan. 
B. DOTMLPF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Doctrine 
The SACC should delegate weapons employment authority 
to the FiST in an ECO environment.  The model clearly 
demonstrates that the added time required getting SACC 
approval for weapons employment can mean the difference 
between a successful engagement and a target escaping 
before fires can be brought to bear.  Further, the scope of 
the FiST‟s responsibility needs to be carefully shaped, 
based on the nature of the battle space. 
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2. Organization 
The researcher suggests that the Company Commander 
should designate another member of the FiST to function as 
the FiST leader in the absence of the designated FiST 
leader.  This designation would allow the FiST leader and 
other members of the Fist to maintain a regular sleep 
schedule and maximize their cognitive effectiveness. 
3. Training 
The SACC should train for ECO by acting as a 
facilitator and force supplier to the FiSTs.  FiSTs should 
train for ECO by taking on the full responsibility to clear 
and coordinate fires in their AO.  The FiST should also 
train to enable it to conduct 24-hour operations without 
disturbing the resting shift. 
4. Materiel 
This research does not suggest any change to the 
FiST‟s Table of Equipment. 
5. Leadership 
This research does not suggest any change to 
leadership of the FiST or supported and supporting 
entities. 
6. Personnel 
This research does not suggest any change to the 
FiST‟s Table of Organization. 
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7. Facilities 
No changes to facilities are suggested by this 
research. 
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
There are numerous areas of this research in which 
further work can be done.   The first area would be to 
improve the input data.  While much of the data in this 
model was supplied from various Marine Corps agencies, the 
researcher found that he still had to use his experience to 
fill in some of the gaps.  If agencies such as TTECG,  
EWTG-PAC, and division schools contributed their data and 
experience, the model could only be improved. 
The MANA model, which provides the event frequencies 
and durations, deserves further refinement in order to 
better capture the nature of events.  The utilization of 
the SAFTE model, while providing needed insight on 
cognitive task effectiveness, does not allow for the FiST 
to adjust their behavior and has significant limitations 
(see Chapter II.B.7).  Further work that addresses these 
limitations, or uses the Improved Performance Research 
Integration Tool (IMPRINT) instead of FAST to interface 
with SAFTE, would create a more realistic model. 
The discrete-event model could be expanded to cover 
all of the EMAGTF‟s units, which will provide a more all-
encompassing measure of how well the EMAGTF‟s fire support 
agencies perform.  Furthermore, some changes to the model 
would allow a researcher to explore how the number and 
types of available CAS and CASEVAC aircraft contribute to 
success.  Moreover, the positioning of the ARG and Forward 
Arming and Refuelling Points (FARPs) could be modeled as 
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well, granting insight into their effects.  The model could 
better capture behaviors with more dynamic decision-making 
rules that would allow agencies to retask when higher 
priority missions arrive.  Additionally, using another 
software package, such as IMPRINT, would enable the model 
to better capture the effects of fatigue on the entire 
process. 
Finally, this research demonstrates that simulation 
can be a valuable asset for MCWL.  The insights gained from 
this research will enable MCWL to fine-tune its live 
exercises in order to get the most benefit out of them and 
avoid exploring unprofitable alternatives.  Further use of 
simulation to assist MCWL is strongly recommended within 
the scope of this research, and beyond it. 
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APPENDIX. SME QUESTIONS 
For all questions, please only rely on your 
experience at (organization) unless otherwise 
noted.  If you have additional insight into any 
questions, please feel free to expand upon it.  
If you wish to be quoted individually, please 
identify any individual quotes as opposed to 





 What is the modal capacity of a FiST to conduct multiple simultaneous or near 
simultaneous fire support and coordination tasks?  Examples of tasks include 
coordinating different firing agencies to strike a single target, engaging multiple 
targets with different agencies,   conducting coordination with neighboring 
units, routing aircraft for CASEVAC/holding/resupply, etc. 
Times 
 Assuming a FiST has only been provided with the relevant target location and 
description: 
o Indirect Fire 
 What is the minimum period of time it would take the FiST to 
develop, coordinate, and communicate its mission to the firing 
agency? 
 What would be the maximum time? 
 What would be the modal (most common) time? 
o Aviation Fires 
 What is the minimum period of time it would take the FiST to 
develop and coordinate the mission?  Brief the mission to the 
aircraft? 
 What would be the maximum time? 
 What would be the modal (most common) time? 
o Combined Arms 
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 What is the minimum period of time it would take the FiST to 
develop and coordinate a mission involving both aviation and 
indirect fire agencies?  Brief to mission to the agencies? 
 What would be the maximum time? 
 What would be the modal (most common) time? 
 Leader 
 Capacity 
 What is the modal (most common) capacity of a FiST leader to conduct multiple 
simultaneous or near simultaneous fire support and coordination tasks?  
Examples of tasks include coordinating different firing agencies to strike a single 
target, engaging multiple targets with different agencies,   conducting 
coordination with neighboring units, routing aircraft for 
CASEVAC/holding/resupply, etc. 
Time 
 After the other FiST members have completed planning a mission: 
o What is the minimum amount of time it takes the FiST leader to QA and 
approve a mission? 
o What is the maximum? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 This question only  based on operating forces experience: 
o When a FiST is deployed to a Phase 2/Phase 3 environment (hold-build), 
what is the average amount of time each day that a FiST leader spent 
conducting official duties not related to fire support (do not include 
eating, exercise, hygiene, recreation, etc.) 
 If he was a company XO 
 If he was a weapon’s platoon commander 
 If held another billet (specify). 
 FAC/JTAC 
Capacity 
 What is the modal (most common) capacity of a FAC/JTAC conducting multiple 
simultaneous or near simultaneous aviation control tasks?  Examples of tasks 
include coordinating different aircraft to strike a single target, engaging multiple 
targets with different aircraft,   conducting coordination with neighboring units, 
routing aircraft for CASEVAC/holding/resupply, conducting ISR, etc. 
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Time 
 From the time a target is detected and located: 
o What is the minimum time it takes the FAC to develop his game plan 
and 9-line while working with FiST (before the FiST  leader approves it)? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 From when a section checks in: 
o What is the minimum amount of time it takes the FAC to pass the 9-line 
to a section and receive the read back? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 Mortar FO 
Capacity 
 What is the modal (most common) capacity of a mortar FO conducting multiple 
simultaneous or near simultaneous aviation control tasks?  Examples of tasks 
include coordinating different agencies to strike a single target, engaging 
multiple targets with different assets,  conducting coordination with 
neighboring units, deconflicting with aircraft? 
Time 
 From the time a target is detected and located: 
o What is the minimum time it takes the FO to develop his game plan and 
CFF while working with FiST (before the FiST  leader approves it)? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 From when the FiST leader approves the mission: 
o What is the minimum amount of time it takes the FO to pass the CFF to 
a firing agency and receive the read back? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 Arty FO 
Capacity 
 What is the modal (most common) capacity of an artillery FO conducting 
multiple simultaneous or near simultaneous aviation control tasks?  Examples of 
tasks include coordinating different agencies to strike a single target, engaging 
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multiple targets with different assets,  conducting coordination with 
neighboring units, deconflicting with aircraft? 
Time 
 From the time a target is detected and located: 
o What is the minimum time it takes the FO to develop his game plan and 
CFF while working with FiST (before the FiST  leader approves it)? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
 From when the FiST leader approves the mission: 
o What is the minimum amount of time it takes the FO to pass the CFF to 
a firing agency and receive the read back? 
o What is the maximum time? 
o What is the modal (most common) amount of time? 
FSCC 
 Capacity 
 What is the modal (most common) capacity of an FSCC to conducting multiple 
simultaneous or near simultaneous fire support tasks?  Examples of tasks 
evaluating and approving/disapproving fire support requests using only one 
agency, fire support requests using multiple agencies, originating and 
prosecuting FSCC fires missions, keeping track of fire support assets, tracking 
friendly maneuver units, managing ISR,  etc. 
 Time 
 From receipt of a fire support request from a subordinate unit using just one 
agency: 
o The minimum time to approve/deny the mission 
o The maximum time 
o The modal (most common) time. 
 From receipt of a fire support request from a subordinate unit using multiple 
firing agencies: 
o The minimum time to approve/deny the mission 
o The maximum time 




Fire Support Agencies 
Artillery 
 How long from receipt of a CFF does it take to: 
 Process the fire support request to the point that the tubes are laid on the target. 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
 From firing the initial salvo to FFE impacting. 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
Mortars 
 How long from receipt of a CFF does it take to: 
 Process the fire support request to the point that the tubes are laid on the target. 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
 From firing the initial salvo to FFE impacting. 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
Aviation 
 How long from receipt of a 9-line to attack a single 
target with just the aircraft: 
 Release ordnance on the target 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
How long from receipt of a 9-line to attack a single 
target marked by another firing agency: 
 Release ordnance on the target 
o Minimum 
o Maximum 




While operating alone or attached to a maneuver unit (not 
the FiST) 




o Modal (most common) 
How long to create and transmit a CFF after detecting 
a target:  
o Minimum 
o Maximum 
o Modal (most common) 
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